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INTRODUCTION
Pension cognoscenti have frequently remarked on the stagnation of
defined benefit pensions and the concomitant rise of defined contribution
plans. I suggest that, over the last generation, something even more
fundamental has occurred, something that can justly be called a paradigm
shift. Americans today primarily conceive of and implement retirement
savings in the form of individual accounts. Such accounts have become
primary instruments of public policy, not just for retirement savings, but
increasingly for health care and education as well.
To some, President Bush's proposals to introduce personal accounts to
the Social Security system and to revise the individual account provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code' appear to be radical departures from the
status quo. In fact, those proposals continue the process of the last three
decades by which the defined contribution plan has become the primary
framework for retirement savings and, more broadly, a fundamental tenet of
tax and social policy.
Pension mavens (myself included) have framed the choice between the
defined benefit and the defined contribution formats as a matter of risk
allocation in the design of retirement savings programs.2 The defined
benefit configuration principally assigns risk to the employer because the
employer guarantees the employee a specified benefit, while the more
privatized defined contribution approach apportions risk to the employee,
because the adequacy vel non of the employee's retirement resources in her
individual account is the employee's problem. This remains an important
truth as far as it goes.
However, the defined contribution society as it has emerged today
entails more considerations than this and constitutes a fundamental
transformation of the way Americans think about and implement tax and
social policy. In a defined contribution society, the policies more likely to
be adopted are those that channel government subsidies through individual
accounts controlled by the taxpayer herself. In contrast, defined benefit
1. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Bush Promotes Earlier Proposals for Tax-Advantaged
Savings Accounts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2004, at A16; Arleen Jacobius & Vineeta Anand, Huge
Implications, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Feb. 17, 2003, at 1; Richard W. Stevenson, Bush
Prepares for Changes in Programs and Cabinet, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2004, at A34. The Bush
proposals would enlarge, simplify, and combine the existing forms of individual accounts. These
proposals would thereby increase quantitative limits on the amounts that can be saved on a tax-
deferred basis and weaken the link between tax deferral and particular purposes for saving.
2. See, e.g., David Millon, Worker Ownership Through 401(k) Retirement Plans: Enron's
Cautionary Tale, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 835, 838 (2002) ("This development is important because
defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans differ in how they allocate investment risk.").
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arrangements-as exemplified by the traditional pension plan and the
federal Social Security system-are less likely to be proposed, adopted, or
expanded. As a result of the increasing prevalence of defined-contribution-
type programs, upper-middle-class taxpayers can in practice undertake all
of their financial savings for retirement, education, and health outlays
through tax-favored individual account devices. If Congress ever formally
transformed the Internal Revenue Code into a federal consumption tax, the
defined contribution paradigm would have paved the way for that
transformation, by acclimating the public to tax-favored accounts for
savings.
While the emergence of the defined contribution society has been a
quiet, largely unheralded revolution, a revolution it has been, incrementally
but fundamentally changing the manner in which Americans think about tax
and social policy and in which their governments formulate such policy.
Like any other paradigm shift, the emergence of the defined contribution
society has both opened opportunities and foreclosed possibilities. As the
members of the Baby Boom generation provide for their retirements,
educate their offspring, and prepare for the medical costs of their older
years, the defined contribution paradigm will be the framework governing
their choices.
The initial Part of this Article describes the differences between defined
benefit and defined contribution plans as retirement savings devices. In this
Part, I emphasize the characteristics of the traditional defined benefit
pension, which pays a deferred retirement annuity based on the
participant's salary and work history, and the contemporary defined
contribution plan, largely self-funded by the participant's salary reduction
contributions to his or her own account. Part Ii discusses these differences
as a matter of retirement plan design: Defined benefit arrangements
principally allocate risk and reward to the sponsoring employer, while
defined contribution devices assign such risk and reward to the participant.
In the third Part, I sketch the major features of the contemporary defined
contribution paradigm and its development to date. This sketch highlights,
inter alia, the extent to which the paradigm today determines how middle-
class individuals and households undertake their medical and educational
savings, making the defined contribution format the norm for such savings.
The fourth Part places the defined contribution paradigm in the context of
the possible futures of the Internal Revenue Code and emphasizes the
extent to which the paradigm has effectively converted the Code into a
consumption tax for middle-class taxpayers. Finally, I label the choices
presented to us by the defined contribution paradigm and identify those that
I think are best.
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I. How ARE THEY DIFFERENT? THE DEFINED BENEFIT AND
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION FORMATS CONTRASTED
In the often opaque morass of pension terminology, the distinction
between defined benefit and defined contribution plans is surprisingly clear.
A defined benefit pension, as its name implies, specifies an output for the
participant. Traditionally, such plans defined benefits for particular
employees based on the employees' respective salary histories and their
periods of employment.3 Thus, for example, a prototypical defined benefit
formula specifies that a participant is entitled at retirement to an annual
income equal to a percentage of her average salary times the number of
years of her employment with the sponsoring employer.4
In contrast, a defined contribution arrangement, as its equally apt
moniker indicates, specifies an input for the participant. Commonly, the
plan defines the employer's contribution for each participant as a
percentage of the participant's salary for that year. Having made that
contribution, the employer's obligation to fund is over because the
employee is not guaranteed a particular benefit, just a specified input. In a
defined contribution context, the participant's ultimate economic
entitlement is the amount to which the defined contributions for her, plus
earnings, grow or shrink.
Defined contribution plans classically took the form of employer-
sponsored pensions (often denoted "money purchase pensions") and of
employment-based profit-sharing arrangements. In the pension incarnation,
the employer sponsoring a defined contribution arrangement has a fixed
annual obligation to contribute, typically a percentage of the participant's
salary. The. profit-sharing alternative, on the other hand, gives the employer
flexibility in determining its contribution. Most obviously, the sponsoring
employer need not contribute anything in a year without profits, unlike a
pension obligation, which is a fixed cost unrelated to profitability. 5 Profit-
3. Union-sponsored plans often use only service in determining the participant's retirement
benefits, e.g., twenty dollars of monthly retirement income for each year of covered employment.
See, e.g., Schweizer Aircraft Corp. v. Local 1752, UAW, 29 F.3d 83, 84 (2d Cir. 1994)
(describing such a plan).
4. See JoHiN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 45
(3d ed. 2000); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Cash Balance Controversy, 19 VA. TAX REV. 683, 687-
91(2000).
5. Defined benefit plans are, by definition, pensions, because the employer is obligated to
fund the benefit promised to its employees. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (as amended in
1976) ("A pension plan within the meaning of section 401(a) is a plan established and maintained
by an employer primarily to provide systematically for the payment of definitely determinable
benefits to his employees over a period of years, usually for life, after retirement."); cf id.
§ 1.40 1-I(b)(1)(ii) ("A profit-sharing plan is a plan established and maintained by an employer to
provide for the participation in his profits by his employees or their beneficiaries.").
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sharing plans can also be designed to permit the employer to decide
annually how much of its profits it wants to contribute. The great flexibility
of profit-sharing plans explains their increasing popularity in recent years,
particularly when that flexibility is contrasted with the regulatory rigidities
surrounding defined benefit pensions.
Traditionally, defined benefit arrangements have promised participants
benefits at retirement in the form of periodic (typically monthly) payments
for the duration of the retired participant's life. Amounts to fund these
benefits (paid by the employer, sometimes augmented by employee
contributions) are invested in a trust fund supervised by trustees. At
retirement, the fund pays the now-retired employee her defined benefit or
purchases an annuity contract for her to provide such periodic benefit.
Thus, for purposes of this discussion, traditional defined benefit
pensions have four major characteristics as a matter of plan design. First,
they provide income on a deferred basis at retirement and not before then.6
Second, traditional defined benefit plans provide such retirement income as
periodic, annuity-type payments rather than as single lump sums. Third,
traditional defined benefit plans are funded collectively, the employer's
contributions being pooled in a common trust fund from which all
participants receive their benefits. Finally, the defined benefit format places
on the employer rather than the employee the obligation to fund the benefit
promised to the participating employee. If the funds in the trust are
inadequate to pay promised benefits, the employer is obligated to make up
the shortfall. Thus, as I shall discuss in the next Part, the risks associated
with funding a defined benefit pension fall principally on the employer.
In all four respects, today's prototypical defined contribution plan
differs. The contemporary defined contribution arrangement distributes to
an employee when she leaves employment, even if she is well short of
retirement age.8 Typically the distribution from a defined contribution plan
today takes the form of a single lump sum payout of the employee's
6. Defined benefit plans often pay a death benefit to the employee's spouse if the employee
dies while working and pay a disability payment if the employee becomes disabled while
working. However, as to a living, healthy employee, the typical traditional defined benefit plan
starts payments only at retirement.
7. If an employer fails financially with an underfunded defined benefit plan, the funding
shortfall may be the responsibility of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the
federal corporation that provides FDIC-type insurance to defined benefit plans. If the employer is
insolvent and the employee's benefit exceeds the level insured by the PBGC, the employee may
be out of luck. On balance, however, the observation in the text is correct: The sponsor of a
defined benefit plan undertakes to guarantee a specified output at retirement and thus bears the
principal risk of a funding shortfall.
8. See PATRICK J. PURCELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE RL30496, PENSION
ISSUES: LUMP-SUM DISTRIBUTIONS AND RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY, at Summary (2003)
("Thus, most recipients of lump sums were more than 20 years away from retirement.").
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account balance rather than an annuity or other periodic distribution spread
over time.9 By its nature, a defined contribution plan does not pool
resources like a defined benefit pension but rather establishes for each
participant his own individual account. Allocated to that account are the
employer's contributions for the employee, the employee's own
contributions (if any), and the earnings or losses generated by the
investment of all those contributions. For this reason, defined contribution
plans are synonymously known as individual account plans.10
Since the employee's entitlement under the plan is the balance of her
individual account, good investment performance redounds to the
employee's benefit (because her account balance is larger), while,
symmetrically, poor investment performance hurts the employee (because
her account balance is smaller and the employer has no obligation to fund a
defined benefit). Thus, as I emphasize in the next Part, defined contribution
plans, in contradistinction to defined benefit arrangements, shift investment
risk and reward from the employer to the employee.
Increasingly, defined contribution assets, while formally held in trust
funds, are invested by each employee herself. Under such self-directed
arrangements," the employee chooses the investments for the amounts in
her individual account.
In short, the label "defined benefit," standing by itself, is in important
ways incomplete. The traditional defined benefit plan specified a quite
particular kind of benefit: a deferred annuity, starting at retirement,
typically measured by the employee's work and salary history. Similarly,
today the moniker "defined contribution" predominantly refers to a profit-
sharing plan with a salary reduction (401 (k)12) arrangement and participant-
directed investing, a plan that distributes to a participant as a lump sum
upon the severance of employment 13 (which, in a world of employee
mobility, 14 often takes place before retirement age). The shift from the
defined benefit modality to the defined contribution one has altered in a
9. See id. at 6.
10. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 3(34), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(34) (2000). In this Article, I shall use the terms "defined contribution plan" and
"individual account plan" interchangeably.
11. Such self-directed accounts are authorized under ERISA section 404(c). See infra notes
108-110 and accompanying text.
12. CBO, UTILIZATION OF TAX INCENTIVES FOR RETIREMENT SAVING 5 (2003) ("All of the
growth in participation in defined-contribution plans between 1975 and 1997 can be attributed to
401(k) plans.").
13. Sometimes a defined contribution distribution may occur even before the participant's
separation from service. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1 (b)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1976) (permitting in-
service profit-sharing distributions as long as "the funds accumulated under the plan" for "a fixed
number of years").
14. See PURCELL, supra note 8, at Summary ("A typical 25-year-old today will work for
seven or more employers before reaching age 65 .... ").
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fundamental manner the way in which Americans experience and think
about retirement savings; simultaneously it has transformed our approach to
other areas of tax and social policy.
II. WHY DOES IT MATTER? ALLOCATING RISK AND REWARD
In this Part, I probe the basic features of defined benefit and defined
contribution plans in terms of the allocation of risk and reward in the design
of retirement arrangements. In terms of retirement planning, there are a
variety of risks that the defined benefit arrangement assigns to the employer
and that a defined contribution plan allocates to the employee. As an initial
matter, it is useful to divide these risks into three broad categories-
investment risk, funding risk, and longevity risk-although, as we shall
soon see, within these categories there are important subclasses that could
themselves plausibly be treated as separate categories of risk. We shall also
see that the assignment of risk and reward to the individual account holder
is a critical feature of the defined contribution paradigm as that paradigm
has spread from the arena of retirement savings to encompass savings for
health and medical outlays.
A. Investment Risk
Consider initially investment risk, the risk that retirement resources will
earn an inadequate rate of return. Defined benefit arrangements impose
investment risk upon the sponsoring employer because the employer,
having promised specified retirement benefits, must provide the additional
contributions to fund those promised benefits even if the plan's assets earn
disappointing returns. In contrast, defined contribution arrangements shift
the risk of poor (and the rewards of better) investment performance to the
employee, because her entitlement under the plan is her account balance,
however low (or high) that balance might be.
For several reasons, it is often advantageous for the employer to absorb
investment risk via a defined benefit arrangement.' 5 An employer investing
a single large pool of pension assets through a trust holding defined benefit
assets can obtain economies of scale unavailable to the employees each
investing for herself, particularly because the employees are often investing
relatively small amounts. By spreading transaction costs over a single large
15. See Daniel Halperin, Employer-Based Retirement Income-the Ideal, the Possible, and
the Reality, 11 ELDER L.J. 37, 61 (2003) ("Employers have much greater capacity than employees
to absorb the risks associated with investment performance. Besides benefiting from economies of
scale, the employer can average out investment results among cohorts of retirees, so it need not
worry about a temporary market downturn.").
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pool of capital, the employer sponsoring a defined benefit arrangement can
achieve a higher net rate of return than can the employees, each investing
on her own.
In theory, economies of scale can be achieved when investing defined
contribution assets because these assets too can be controlled on a
centralized basis by the plan's trustees. In that case also, the costs of
commissions and investment advice can be spread over a larger pool of
employer-managed capital with resulting economies of scale. In practice,
however, today's defined contribution plans typically take the form of self-
directed 401(k) plans under which the employee invests her own
resources, 16 even if her investment choice is simply to leave her funds in the
plan's default investment option.17 Thus, the realistic choice today is
between defined benefit plans, with the economies of scale they can achieve
through centralized investment of a single pooled fund, and self-directed
defined contribution plans that, in contrast, entail proportionately higher
transaction costs because retirement resources are managed on a dispersed
basis by individual employees in their own separate accounts.1 8 There is,
moreover, a substantial consensus that many (perhaps most) employees in
self-directed defined contribution arrangements are poor investors,
regardless of how much is spent educating and advising them. 19
16. LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & KATHRYN L. MOORE, LAW OF EMPLOYEE PENSION AND
WELFARE BENEFITS 45 (2004) ("[A]Imost 90 percent of 401(k) plans permit the participants to
control the investment of their accounts subject to the options provided by the plan.").
17. See, e.g., JAMES J. CHOI ET AL., DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS: PLAN RULES,
PARTICIPANT DECISIONS, AND THE PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 8655, 2001) ("[E]mployer choices of default savings rates and
default investment funds strongly influence employee savings levels. Even though employees
have the opportunity to opt out of such defaults, few actually do so."); JAMES J. CHOI ET AL., FOR
BETTER OR FOR WORSE: DEFAULT EFFECTS AND 40 1(K) SAVINGS BEHAVIOR 5 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8651, 2001) ("Under automatic enrollment, 65-87% of new
plan participants save at the default contribution rate and invest exclusively in the default fund.");
Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1159, 1172-73 (2003).
18. See Colleen E. Medill, Challenging the Four "Truths" of Personal Social Security
Accounts: Evidence from the World of401 (k) Plans, 81 N.C. L. REV. 901, 907-08, 937-46 (2003)
(discussing the impact of mutual fund fees on the worker's account balance at retirement); see
also Alicia H. Munnell, Comment, in HENRY J. AARON & JOHN B. SHOVEN, SHOULD THE UNITED
STATES PRIVATIZE SOCIAL SECURITY? 133, 137 (Benjamin M. Friedman ed., 1999) (noting that
"IRA-type account[s] would be extremely costly" because of "transaction costs").
19. See David M. Cutler, Comment, in AARON & SHOVEN, supra note 18, at 123, 129
("[M]any people (particularly the poor) may not be good investors."); Richard L. Kaplan, Enron,
Pension Policy, and Social Security Privatization, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 83 (2004) ("[M]ost
employees have neither the training, the interest, nor the desire to become competent money
managers .... It is hardly surprising, therefore, that individually managed retirement accounts
perform more poorly than professionally managed accounts, often by significant margins.");
Norman Stein, Three and Possibly Four Lessons About ERISA That We Should, but Probably Will
Not, Learn from Enron, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 855, 861, 861-68 (2002) (claiming that the
argument that "investor education can mitigate the problem of employees allocating excessive
amounts of their investments in plans to employer stock.... is problematic").
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A component of investment risk stems from employers' longer time
horizons, which permit employers (or to be precise, plan trustees engaged
by employers) to invest in riskier, but ultimately more profitable,
investments than can many employees, particularly older persons with
shorter time horizons to retirement and thus less ability to make riskier
investments. The basic considerations are now well known under the rubric
of portfolio theory:20 An older 401(k) participant's choice of a riskier
investment with a higher long-run return is potentially problematic because
she may not have the time to wait for the investment's rebound-assuming
that rebound will occur.2' In contrast, with a longer time horizon, a defined
benefit plan can more comfortably make this riskier but more profitable
investment. This subcategory of investment risk can be denoted as
"temporal risk," the time-based danger associated with riskier investments
because such investments' variability may strike on the downside at an
inopportune time in the individual's life span, i.e., when she needs her
retirement resources to live.
The self-investing participant can respond to this temporal risk by
eschewing riskier investments, but a more conservative strategy reduces her
long-term rate of return as she limits herself to less aggressive possibilities.
Alternatively, a defined contribution participant concerned about the
temporal risk of aggressive investments but sensitive to the lower returns
earned by more conservative deployments of her capital can use her
individual account resources to purchase an annuity contract. The insurer
issuing that annuity contract (like a defined benefit plan) has a longer
(arguably infinite) time horizon that permits the insurer to invest more
aggressively; the insurer's consequently superior long-run investment
return will be reflected in the terms of the annuity contract purchased by the
participant.
However, this private response to temporal risk carries with it the
shortcomings inherent in participant-directed investing: There are
disecononies of scale when myriad defined contribution retirees purchase
annuities individually. Many of those retirees may be unsophisticated
investors who are ignorant either of temporal risk or of their ability to
contract out of it by purchasing annuity policies from companies with
20. For a technical presentation of these ideas, see ZvI BODIE & ROBERT C. MERTON,
FINANCE 255-57, 272-77, 299-303, 318-37 (2000). For a presentation aimed at a general
audience, see M. JOHN STERBA, JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF PERSONAL INVESTING: A GUIDE FOR
LAWYERS AND OTHER PROFESSIONALS 8-43 (1997).
21. If a seventy-year-old conceives of his retirement resources as testamentary in nature, his
perspective may be different, because, in that case, he may think in terms of the longer life
expectancies of his younger heirs, intended to be the ultimate recipients of those resources.
However, insofar as retirement resources are for financing retirement, a seventy-year-old has a far
shorter time horizon than does a thirty-year-old.
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longer time horizons; paying to educate these investors costs money and is
not always successful. Here, then, is another investment-based argument for
the defined benefit plan, which facilitates better long-term investment
performance by imposing temporal risk on the employer.
B. Funding Risk
A second major category of risk allocated to the employer by the
defined benefit format can be denoted "funding risk,' 22 i.e., the danger that
the funds necessary to finance adequate retirement benefits will not be
contributed to the plan. By definition, a defined benefit plan places primary
responsibility upon the employer for financing the benefits promised by the
plan.23 Indeed, as I will discuss below, 24 ERISA imposed complex and
opaque funding obligations on defined benefit sponsors to ensure that that
responsibility is executed properly. In similar fashion, a money purchase
pension, though it is a defined contribution device, is a pension plan and
thus imposes upon the employer the legal responsibility to fund .the
contributions required under the plan. While the employee is not guaranteed
that those contributions will grow to any particular level (investment risk
and reward fall on the employee), the employee covered by a money
purchase arrangement is assured that the employer will, as an initial matter,
make the promised inputs to the plan.
In practice, however, defined contribution plans today come not in the
pension variant but in forms that place the principal funding risk on the
employee. Most prominently, 401(k) plans usually require the employee to
elect reduced salary for funds to be contributed to the plan on the
employee's behalf.25 If an employee does not so elect, the failure to fund
her 401(k) account is the employee's problem, not the employer's
responsibility. 26 By shifting funding risk to employees, i.e., by requiring
401(k) participants to make affirmative decisions to save from current
22. FROLIK & MOORE, supra note 16, at 34-35.
23. Some defined benefit plans have a contributory feature under which each participant
makes an explicit contribution to the plan. Today, such contributory plans are less common than
they once were. Most economists believe that employers' payments to qualified plans ultimately
result in reduced current compensation and thus an implicit contribution by the covered employee.
24. See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
25. Regina T. Jefferson, Post-Enron Pension Reform: Where Do We Go from Here?, in NEW
YORK UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION § 10.01, at
10-1, § 10.02[3], at 10-10 (Alvin D. Lurie ed., 2003). I discuss 401(k) plans in detail infra Section
III.B.
26. The same is also true under 403(b) plans.
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salary, the defined contribution paradigm may be pushing some (perhaps
many) employees down the path of inadequate retirement savings.27
Or consider conventional profit-sharing plans under which the
employer, in its discretion, may or may not contribute to the plan in any
given year. Because the employer has no obligation to make discretionary
profit-sharing contributions in any particular year,28 the employer's failure
to make such contributions causes the employee's account to be unfunded.
While the employee has no legal obligation to fund in this context, the
economic risk of no or inadequate funding falls upon the employee, because
the employer's failure to make adequate contributions to its profit-sharing
plan results in a deficient account for the employee at retirement.
C. Longevity Risk
Consider finally longevity risk, i.e., the danger that a retiree will outlive
her retirement resources. 29 The traditional, annuity-paying defined benefit
plan provides at least partial protection against longevity risk because such
a traditional pension disburses retirement payments periodically (typically
monthly) and continues such annuity-type payments until the participant's
death--often with payments continuing at a reduced level to the surviving
spouse. With such a lifetime annuity it is by definition impossible for the
retiree to outlive her pension income, though that income may decline in
real value if it is not increased to reflect increments in the cost of living.
The defined contribution participant can eliminate her longevity risk on
her own by annuitizing her account balance.30 In particular, a retiree can use
her account balance from a 401(k) or another kind of profit-sharing plan, a
money purchase plan, an IRA, or a 403(b) account to buy an individual
commercial annuity policy for herself (and, perhaps, her spouse). That
annuity policy will replicate the periodic, lifetime payout from a defined
benefit arrangement.
27. The insights of behavioral economics may supply a remedy to this problem of employee
undersaving, namely default rules that affirmatively require employees to opt out if they wish to
refrain from saving. See infra notes 258-260 and accompanying text.
28. An employer cannot avoid profit-sharing contributions indefinitely. To qualifiy as a profit-
sharing plan, there must, over the years, "be recurring and substantial contributions out of profits
for the employees." Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(2) (as amended in 1976).
29. See RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, PENSIONS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 30-32 (1986);
DAN M. MCGILL ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 444 (7th ed. 1996); Peter
Orszag & Norman Stein, Cross-Tested Defined Contribution Plans: A Response to Professor
Zelinsky, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 629, 654-55 (2001).
30. William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, Whither Pensions? A Brief Analysis of Portman-
Cardin 111, 99 TAx NOTES 573, 574 (2003) ("[Ajnnuitization is crucial to ensuring that retirees
will not outlive their savings."). As noted earlier, annuity contracts can also be used to mitigate
temporal risk because the issuer has a longer horizon for investments than does the individual
annuity purchaser.
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However, such individualized solutions to the problem of longevity risk
entail adverse selection3 for insurers selling individual annuity policies,
namely the danger that those most concerned about longevity risk and
purchasing protection against it will indeed be the persons who live longest.
The retirees buying commercial annuities for themselves because they are
concerned about longevity risk tend to be people who perceive (often
accurately) that they are healthier than their peers and thus likely to live
beyond their actuarial life expectancies. Consequently, commercial insurers
charge a premium for the individual annuity policies they sell because the
purchasers of such policies tend to be more long lived than their peers who
do not purchase such annuities.32 The premium from the insurers'
perspective is a penalty from the retirees'. This penalty/premium leads
many experts to prefer the defined benefit arrangement as a superior device
for mitigating longevity risk.33
In theory, defined contribution plans can be designed in a fashion that
ameliorates longevity risk in the same way as defined benefit arrangements.
In particular, if a defined contribution plan provides for only the
annuitization of distributions and furnishes no other distribution option
(e.g., no lump sum payments), the plan will purchase annuity contracts that
do not reflect a premium for adverse selection, because the group of
covered employees will have a normal distribution of life expectancies. In
practice, however, this option rarely exists; today, virtually all defined
contribution plans distribute participants' account balances to them as lump
sums rather than as annuities. This leaves each retiree concerned about
31. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN
SOCIAL INSURANCE 16 (1999) (defining adverse selection as "the tendency of those at high risk to
be overrepresented in the insurance pool."). Professor Schuck has recently defined adverse
selection as a "diversity-related impediment to market efficiency." PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY
IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE DISTANCE 58 (2003). According to Schuck,
Where participants in an insurance pool are diverse in ways that pose significantly
different risks of loss but their premiums are based on average risk rather than on their
own risk, people who pose lower-than-average risks will want to avoid or abandon this
pool in favor of insurance for which they can pay a premium reflecting their own, lower
risk.
Id.; see also PETER A. DIAMOND & PETER R. ORSZAG, SAVING SOCIAL SECURITY: A BALANCED
APPROACH 73 (2004) ("Adverse selection stems from the fact that those who expect to benefit
more from insurance are more likely to buy it .... ).
32. See GAO, No. GAO-03-309, SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: INFORMATION ON USING A
VOLUNTARY APPROACH TO INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS 18 (2003) ("As a result [of adverse
selection], annuity prices can be as much as 14 percent higher than they would be if every retiree
purchased an annuity, according to one study."); Medill, supra note 18, at 958 ("The traditional
explanation given by economists for the low demand for traditional annuities is the problem of
adverse selection."); id. at 959 ("Annuity providers will price the traditional annuity at a higher
cost to account for this systemic increased risk of longevity among purchasers of traditional
annuities.").
33. See, e.g., Medill, supra note 18, at 960 (discussing how adverse selection "can be easily
avoided" with "defined benefit plans sponsored by private employers").
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longevity risk to purchase her own annuity contract; that, in turn, leads to
an adverse selection problem, as the retirees who purchase such contracts
tend, as a group, to be more long lived than those who do not.
While the universal, compulsory nature of Social Security is often
justified in redistributive terms (Social Security provides proportionately
more retirement income for lower-paid workers) 34 and in paternalistic terms
(Social Security compensates for workers' short-sighted failure to save),35
longevity risk is, in important respects, the most compelling defense of a
mandatory, annuity-providing public pension program like Social Security.
By definition, there can be no adverse selection when no one can opt out of
a compulsory, universal pension pool.
Even if there were no adverse selection problem in the market for
individually purchased annuities, there is substantial market-based risk for
the 401(k) or IRA holder who purchases an individual annuity upon her
retirement. If that retiree is lucky enough to terminate employment during a
bull market, her lump sum distribution will be large and the resulting gains
will be locked in when she converts her substantial lump sum into an
annuity contract. On the other hand, if a 401(k) participant or IRA holder
retires and purchases an annuity during a bear market, her smaller lump
sum distribution will translate into a permanently smaller annuity. True,
that retiree could try to wait out the bear market and purchase an annuity
later. However, that wait entails its own risks: For example, the market
might go even lower.
Moreover, the defined contribution participant purchasing her own
annuity upon retirement bears the risk associated with the purchase rates of
annuity contracts. If the participant buys her annuity contract when insurers
are assuming higher returns, her lump sum will purchase a more generous
annual income than if she retires when annuity contracts are less favorable.
Thus, even absent adverse selection in the market for privately
purchased annuities, the ability of an individual account retiree to shift
longevity risk to the issuer of an individually purchased annuity contract
entails market risk (and possible reward) for that retiree. The historic
evidence indicates that, because of varying market conditions including the
fluctuating interest rate assumptions used by annuity issuers, returns to
retirees can "vary enormously and over relatively short periods of time. 36
34. See, e.g., John B. Shoven, Social Security Reform: Two Tiers Are Better than One, in
AARON & SHOVEN, supra note 18, at 1, 15 (arguing that Social Security's "redistribution from
those with higher lifetime earnings to those with lower earnings is entirely appropriate and worth
preserving").
35. See, e.g., DIAMOND& ORSZAG, supra note 31, at 73; Munnell, supra note 18, at 144.
36. Henry J. Aaron, Social Security: Tune It Up, Don't Trade It In, in AARON & SHOVEN,
supra note 18, at 55, 64.
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In contrast, a traditional defined benefit plan can self-annuitize,
providing annual payments to retirees from its common pool of funds.
Alternatively, the traditional defined benefit pension can purchase annuity
contracts throughout the retiree's career and thereby avoid the need to buy
an annuity at a single (potentially unfavorable) moment. While a well-
informed individual account holder might similarly purchase annuity
policies throughout her career, there is to date no evidence that this
investment pattern is in fact widespread. Even if it were, myriad purchases
of individual annuities would entail diseconomies of scale, such as fees and
administrative costs, that are avoided by pension trusts' centralized
purchases of annuities for groups of employees.
D. Qualifications
None of this is to say that defined benefit plans are risk free for their
participants; no financial arrangement can be devoid of risk for the
parties.37 For example, a defined benefit participant whose annuity
entitlement is specified in nominal rather than real dollars bears the risk that
inflation will erode the purchasing power of her retirement distribution. In
this sense, the defined benefit participant is the holder of a fixed claim like
a bondholder and, as such, is exposed to the dangers of inflation or the
possible benefits of deflation.
Even if a defined benefit plan provides cost-of-living increases for
retirees, inflation represents an important risk for the defined benefit
participant who terminates employment prior to retirement and is entitled to
an annuity fixed in nominal terms. In such instances, even if a cost-of-living
adjustment kicks in at age sixty-five, there is no compensation for inflation
before then.
Similarly, in the event of catastrophic default, i.e., the insolvency of
both the plan and its sponsoring employer, the participant, to the extent her
benefits exceed the level insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC),38 bears the lOSS. 39 Again, in this context, analogizing a
37. Even U.S. Treasury debt, universally considered the benchmark for risk-free investment,
carries with it the (remote) possibility that the federal government could suspend its debt
payments.
38. See infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the PBGC.
39. Some pension analysts use the term "default risk" more broadly than I do in this Article.
See, e.g., BODIE & MERTON, supra note 20, at 36; JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY (forthcoming 2005)
(manuscript at 53, on file with author). While a more expansive concept of default risk is usefil in
certain settings, for purposes of my analysis it is helpful to distinguish the circumstances that can
cause an employer to default on its pension promise, e.g., pension assets earn an inadequate rate
of return, the employer funds inadequately, or the employer goes out of business before financing
promised benefits. The first possibility is subsumed within the concept of investment risk, while
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defined benefit participant to a bondholder is instructive. Insofar as the
participant's pension claim is insured by the PBGC, the participant (like the
owner of an insured debenture) has recourse to the PBGC if the employer-
issuer becomes insolvent and the collateral (i.e., the pension trust assets)
becomes inadequate. However, to the extent a defined benefit participant's
claim exceeds the amount covered by the PBGC, employer default is a risk
that falls on the participant, as pension trust assets may be insufficient to
pay promised benefits after the employer's insolvency. For such a
participant, employer default represents undiversifiable risk because her job
and her pension (to the extent it is noninsured and inadequately funded)
both depend upon the employer's continued viability.
There is an important intergenerational element to the defined benefit
risk of employer default: Such risk is concentrated most heavily upon
younger plan participants who are neither withdrawing funds from the plan
nor close to starting such withdrawals. As current retirees receive their
payments and thus extract the funds of the pension trust ahead of younger
active participants, the risk of employer default diminishes for these
retirees, because they have their retirement resources in hand and, to that
extent, are protected against default. If the plan terminates, these current
retirees, by statute, have a higher claim on the assets of the defined benefit
pension trust than do younger participants. 40 These younger participants are
the ones who will be left holding the proverbial bag if the plan and the
employer both become insolvent.
To the extent the PBGC insures pension payments in the face of plan
and employer default, the risk for younger participants shifts from the
solvency of the plan and the employer to the solvency of the PBGC. And
here there are reasonable bases for worry, given the deficits the PBGC itself
confronts.4 ' Younger participants, from one perspective, are the greatest
beneficiaries of PBGC coverage (because they are furthest away from
the second scenario goes to funding risk. I think it makes sense to limit the concept of "default
risk" to the situation in which the employer goes out of business, leaving behind an inadequately
funded pension.
40. ERISA § 4044(a)(3)-(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3)-(4) (2000).
41. America's Pensions: The Next Savings and Loan Crisis?: Hearing Before the Senate
Special Comm. on Aging, 108th Cong. 51, 49-53 (2003) [hereinafter America's Pensions]
(statement of Steven A. Kandarian, Executive Dir., PBGC) ("During FY 2002, PBGC's single-
employer insurance program went from a surplus of $7.7 billion to a deficit of $3.6 billion-a loss
of $11.3 billion in just one year. The $11.3 billion loss is more than five times larger than any
previous one-year loss in the agency's 29-year history."); GAO, NO. GAO-04-90, PENSION
BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION: SINGLE-EMPLOYER PENSION INSURANCE PROGRAM FACES
SIGNIFICANT LONG-TERM RISKS 1 (2003) (stating that "the long-term viability of the program is
at risk" as to PBGC single-employer insurance program); Mary Williams Walsh, U.S. Insurer of
Pensions Says Its Deficit Has Soared, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2004, at C 1.
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claiming pension trust assets) and are consequently at greatest risk if the
PBGC itself is ultimately incapable of meeting its obligations.
The "back-loaded" nature of defined benefit plans42 creates another
kind of risk for the participant: She may lose her employment and thus her
plan coverage just as she is about to earn the most valuable benefits under
the plan. Because older employees tend to be more highly paid, their salary-
based pension entitlements escalate late in their careers. An employee may
work for an employer sponsoring a defined benefit plan in anticipation of
earning significant pension benefits toward the end of her career and then
be fired on the cusp of those high-pay years. Even for an employee whose
compensation does not increase in her later years, the pension accruals of
those years will have increased present value because the employee is
closer to retirement than before and a pension dollar to be received shortly
has greater present value than does a pension dollar to be received far in the
future.
The Code and ERISA preclude certain types of back-loading by
proscribing plan formulas that delay pension accruals until the end of the
employee's work life.43 However, even with these statutory safeguards, as a
matter of economics the most valuable pension accruals under traditional
44
defined benefit formulas occur late in the employee's career when her
salary is higher and she is closer to retirement.45 The defined benefit
participant thus bears the risk that she will be fired on the eve of those more
valuable accruals.
A variation of this risk is the danger that the employee, while retaining
her job, will lose defined benefit coverage as she is about to enter her most
valuable years of employment. In this scenario, the employer terminates its
defined benefit plan just as the employee embarks upon her years of high
pay and therefore of valuable pension accruals. Even if the employer
replaces the terminated defined benefit pension with an individual account
plan, the employee will have lost the particularly lucrative late-career years
of defined benefit coverage.
At its core, this is the source of the controversy surrounding cash
balance plans, which I discuss below. Employees who work in anticipation
that they will earn valuable pension benefits late in their careers instead find
themselves covered by cash balance arrangements. It is an understatement
42. See Zelinsky, supra note 4, at 688-9 1.
43. I.R.C. § 41 l(b)(1) (2000); ERISA § 204(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(i).
44. Note that even union-sponsored plans tend to be back-loaded because twenty dollars of
monthly pension income earned by a sixty-year-old will, in present value terms, be more valuable
than that same twenty dollars of monthly pension income earned by a thirty-year-old.
45. See Zelinsky, supra note 4, at 688-91.
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to say that this has disappointed these employees' expectations of
significant pension accruals in their later years.
In light of all of this, I think it fair to criticize some defined benefit
advocates (myself included) for tending to ignore or understate the financial
risks of defined benefit arrangements for their participants. However, the
fundamental point remains valid: Defined benefit pensions, in the main,
impose upon the employer the predominant risks of providing adequate
retirement income-funding, investment, and longevity risk. While the
risks to the defined benefit participant are not de minimis, they are not as
large as the risks assumed by the employer sponsoring a defined benefit
plan nor as substantial as the risks assigned to the employee under
individual account arrangements.
E. Summary
A strong case can be made that it is efficient to place various risks
associated with retirement planning upon the employer, as defined benefit
plans do. Investment risk, funding risk, and longevity risk all present
challenges for the individual investor. And, in the final analysis, today's
prototypical defined contribution participant, who finances her retirement
savings through salary reduction and self-directs the investment of her
individual account, is an individual investor.
In contrast, when a workforce and its retirement resources are pooled
and invested collectively, as in the case of the classic defined benefit
arrangement, economies of scale and other efficiencies are achieved by
investing a single common pool. When the onus is placed on employers to
provide defined benefits to their respective employees, investment risk
(including temporal risk) and funding risk fall on employers, who will
likely handle those risks better than the average employee. Similarly, an
annuity-paying defined benefit plan, because it covers a more representative
swath of the workforce, is a better answer to the challenge of longevity risk
than is the individual purchase of annuity policies, subject to the problems
of adverse selection and diseconomies of scale.
Offsetting these considerations is the reality that the allocation of risk
carries with it the allocation of reward. If, in the defined benefit context,
investment performance is good, the employer, having absorbed the risk,
reaps the profit. The employer sponsoring a defined benefit has promised its
employees an output, assuming a particular rate of return on the plan's
assets. Better-than-assumed investment performance means the employer
need contribute less (perhaps even nothing) to fund the promised benefits.
Similarly, the benefits promised by the plan are premised on certain
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mortality assumptions. If employees and their beneficiaries are less long
lived than has been assumed, the employer need put less into the plan.
Conversely, in the defined contribution context, the reward to the
employee for absorbing risk is the potential profit of superior investment
gain in her own account. In a prolonged bull market, the allocation of risk
and reward to the participant looks attractive as she sees her account
balance climb with seeming inevitability. When the bears return and
individual account balances stagnate or decline, the employer's promise to
pay a defined benefit acquires new appeal-ironically, at the same time that
the cost of providing that benefit increases for the employer because
declining or stagnant values of plan assets require the employer to
contribute more to remedy the shortfall and thereby pay promised
benefits. 6
In light of these considerations, retirement savings specialists (myself
included) have tended to view the choice between the defined benefit and
the defined contribution configurations as a matter of allocating risk and
reward among employers and employees and have been concerned that
allocating risk and reward to employees, while appropriate for many of
them, might ultimately prove problematic for a significant percentage of
plan participants. However, this story of risk/reward allocation increasingly
appears to be only part of the truth, a large-indeed the predominant-part
of the truth but not the totality. At its core, the defined contribution
paradigm reflects an individualized conception of retirement savings, a
conception that carries tremendous appeal in a culture that, like ours, places
a high value on private property and individual autonomy.
III. How DID IT HAPPEN?
In this Part, I review the major steps by which the defined contribution
paradigm became entrenched in American retirement, tax, and social
policy. As a preliminary matter, it is important not to overstate the decline
of defined benefit plans. Many such plans remain in existence, holding
roughly $1.6 trillion in assets and covering approximately one-fifth of all
full-time private-sector employees. 47  Almost three-quarters of the
46. See, e.g., America's Pensions, supra note 41, at 50 ("[A]s of December 31, 2002,... the
total underfunding in single-employer plans exceeded $400 billion, the largest number ever
recorded. Even with recent rises in the stock market and interest rates, PBGC projects that
underfunding still exceeds $350 billion today."); Cassell Bryan-Low & Robin Sidel, The Pension-
Plan Pit: Major Companies Face Shortfall of Billions of Dollars, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2002, at
C I ("The contributions holiday of the late 1990s that many companies enjoyed as a result of the
long bull market is now grinding to a halt.").
47. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND
RELATING TO THE FUNDING RULES FOR EMPLOYER-SPONSORED DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS AND
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companies listed in the S&P 500 sponsor defined benefit plans. 8
Nevertheless, the defined benefit system today stagnates; both the number
of such plans and the number of participants in them have declined.49
"Since 1986, 97,000 [defined benefit] plans with 7 million participants have
terminated., 50 Events during the summer and fall of 2004 suggest that the
airline industry, one of the last private-sector bastions of defined benefit
pensions, may be moving to shed such pensions.5' In contrast, defined
contribution devices, most prominently 401(k) plans and IRAs, have by all
indicators grown. Today,, significantly more private-sector employees
participate in defined contribution retirement arrangements than in defined
benefit plans. Indeed, the percentage of full-time, private-sector employees
participating in defined contribution plans, forty percent, is roughly double
the percentage of private-sector employees covered by defined benefit
arrangements.52  The assets held by employer-sponsored defined
contribution plans (roughly $2.1 trillion) exceed by a wide margin the
THE FINANCIAL POSITION OF THE PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION ("PBGC") 44, 48
(Comm. Print 2003), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-39-03.pdf. Different estimates vary
in detail but not in substance. For example, Federal Reserve data indicate that "[a]t the end of
2002, there was $2.1 trillion in corporate defined contribution plans, compared with $1.59 trillion
in corporate defined benefit plans." Arleen Jacobius, Rollover Money To Eclipse DB and DC
Plans'Assets, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Mar. 31, 2003, at 3. Data developed by the Society of
Professional Administrators and Record Keepers paints a similar picture of the size of defined
benefit plans. Id.
48. Administration Drafting Proposals To Preserve Pension Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
2003, at C17. The numbers in the text underestimate the relative strength of the defined
contribution paradigm because many surviving defined benefit plans have adopted the cash
balance format, which mimics in important respects defined contribution arrangements. On cash
balance plans, see infra Section III.F.
49. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., supra note 47, at 46-48.
50. Funding Challenge: Keeping Defined Benefit Pension Plans Afloat: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Fin., 108th Cong. 57 (2003) (prepared statement of Steven A. Kandarian,
Executive Dir., PBGC); see also id. at 37-38 (prepared statement of Henry Eickelberg, Staff Vice
President, Gen. Dynamics, representative of the Am. Benefits Council) ("The total number of
defined benefit plans has decreased from a high of 170,000 in 1985 to 56,405 in 1998 (the most
recent year for which official Department of Labor statistics exist), and most analysts believe
there are fewer than 50,000 plans in the U.S. today. There has been a corresponding decline in the
percentage of American workers with a defined benefit plan as their primary retirement plan from
38 percent in 1980 to 21 percent in 1997." (footnote omitted)).
51. See Joel Chcrnoff & Nicholas Braude, Airline Industry Ponders UAL Move, PENSIONS &
INVESTMENTS, Aug. 9, 2004, at 1; Mary Williams Walsh, Bailout Feared ifAirlines Shed Their
Pensions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2004, at Al.
52. Press Release, House Committee on Education and the Workforce, Witnesses Cite
Burdensome Rules and Regulations as Causes for Decline in Defined Benefit Pension Plans (June
4, 2003), available at http://edworkforce.house.gov/press/pressl08/06jun/pensionhrgO60403.htm
("According to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), there were 32,321 defined
benefit plans insured by the agency last year, down from 114,000 in 1985. Furthermore, the
percentage of active workers covered by these plans is down from 38 percent in 1985 to 23
percent today."); see also CBO, supra note 12, at 4 ("[From 1975 to 1997,] the percentage
participating in defined-contribution plans increased from less than 15 percent to 40 percent.");
Patrick Purcell, Retirement Savings and Household Wealth in 2000: Analysis of Census Bureau
Data, J. PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE, Summer 2003, at 48, 53.
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assets of defined benefit arrangements. If amounts held in IRAs are added
to the amounts in defined contribution plans, the size difference between
defined contribution assets and defined benefit assets grows even larger.
53
All of this represents a significant reversal of historic patterns under which
the traditional defined benefit plan was the dominant paradigm for the
provision of retirement income.54
A. The Role of ERISA
How did the defined benefit plan go from the behemoth of the private
retirement system to a secondary player? The story starts with the adoption
of ERISA in 1974." 3 Of course, defined contribution plans existed before
ERISA. In the pre-ERISA era, many employers maintained profit-sharing
or money purchase pension plans, though these typically supplemented
defined benefit pensions. Among nonprofit employers, particularly colleges
and universities, the normal retirement savings arrangement was (and still
is) a 403(b) annuity, an individual account funded by employee
contributions, often matched by the employer's contributions. Nevertheless,
in the years before ERISA, the traditional defined benefit plan was the
dominant device for retirement savings.
In four ways, ERISA, without anyone planning it that way, started the
trend toward the defined contribution society as we know it today. First,
ERISA created the individual retirement account (IRA), a device that
played a critical role in acclimating Americans to the notion of tax-
advantaged 56  individual accounts. Second, ERISA placed regulatory
53. See Allen Kenney, IRS Announces Release of Spring 2004 SOI Bulletin, 104 TAx NOTES
601, 601 (2004) ("By the end of 2000, the report says, 46 million taxpayers held a total of $2.6
trillion in IRAs."); Jacobius, supra note 47.
54. And these numbers do not reflect the assets held in individual accounts for educational
and medical purposes.
55. The origins of ERISA are well explored in WOOTEN, supra note 39.
56. It is important to distinguish between the tax advantages under current law of qualified
plans and the view that current law constitutes a tax subsidy or, to use the more conventional term,
tax expenditure. The Code's treatment of qualified plan earnings (i.e., the deferral of tax until the
distribution of such earnings to the plan participants) is undoubtedly more advantageous than
current law's approach to investment earnings arising outside qualified plans (i.e., immediate
taxation as earned). This advantage is commonly labeled a tax subsidy or a tax expenditure. For
two reasons, I am skeptical of these labels as applied to qualified plans. First, current law's
treatment of qualified plans falls within the range of plausible choices for a normative income tax.
A rational legislator, seeking not to subsidize retirement plans but to tax them properly, could
plausibly have made the choices embodied in current law considering such criteria as
administrability, popular acceptance, and taxpayer liquidity. Second, current law's treatment of
qualified plans is normatively correct if one favors cash flow consumption taxation, i.e., deferring
taxation of savings until savings are used for consumption. From either vantage, it is misleading to
call the Code's treatment of qualified plans a tax expenditure, because that treatment implements
tax norms rather than subsidizing qualified plans.
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burdens upon defined benefit plans in a way that made the more flexible
defined contribution devices, particularly profit-sharing plans, more
attractive to employers than traditional defined benefit arrangements. Third,
ERISA's fiduciary rules incented employers to shift to self-directed defined
contribution arrangements under which participants control the investment
of their own retirement resources. Finally, ERISA permitted defined
contribution plans to hold more stock of sponsoring employers than defined
benefit arrangements. Cumulatively but inadvertently, these regulatory
choices embodied in ERISA started America down the path to the
contemporary defined contribution society.
1. The Creation of the Individual Retirement Account
Among the many issues confronted by the drafters of ERISA, none
were knottier than the two topics labeled "portability" and "coverage" 57 for
those not participating in employer-sponsored plans. Under the rubric of
portability, those who crafted ERISA addressed the situation of the vested
but younger participant who leaves employment prior to his retirement age.
Under pre-ERISA practice, it was common (particularly under traditional
defined benefit plans) for the (now-terminated) employee to receive nothing
at the time he severed employment. Rather, he remained entitled to a
deferred benefit, payable on a delayed basis upon the subsequent attainment
of retirement age. For both administrative and economic reasons, this delay
was often problematic, particularly as to relatively young employees. As an
administrative matter, the plan and the terminated participant had to stay in
touch with one another for the participant to receive information about the
plan and his benefit and, ultimately, for the participant to get paid. Such
participant tracking could be (and still is) resource consuming.
58
For elaboration of the argument that the current tax treatment of qualified plans is not a tax
subsidy but rather is consistent with choices that can be properly be made in designing a
normative income tax, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Qualified Plans and Identifying Tax
Expenditures: A Rejoinder to Professor Stein, 9 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 257 (1991); Edward A.
Zelinsky, Tax Policy v. Revenue Policy: Qualified Plans, Tax Expenditures, and the Flat, Plan
Level Tax, 13 VA. TAX REV. 591 (1994); and Edward A. Zelinsky, The Tax Treatment of
Qualified Plans: A Classic Defense of the Status Quo, 66 N.C. L. REv. 315 (1988). Professor
Wooten, analyzing the historic origins of the tax treatment of qualified plans, concludes that those
who crafted that treatment in fact did not intend to subsidize but rather sought to tax such plans
properly. James A. Wooten, The 'Original Intent' of the Federal Tax Treatment of Private
Pension Plans, 85 TAX NOTES 1305 (1999). That conclusion reinforces my skepticism about the
application of the tax expenditure label to the current tax treatment of qualified plans. See also
infra text accompanying notes 264-265.
57. The term "coverage" is also used to address situations where an employer maintains a
plan and the issue is how much of the workforce must be included within the plan. I.R.C. § 410(b)
(2000).
58. See Halperin, supra note 15, at 60 (discussing the "difficulties in requiring employers and
employees to keep track of each other").
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Even more seriously, there was (and still is) no requirement for defined
benefit plans to adjust a terminated participant's benefit to reflect inflation
or the time value of money between his termination of employment and his
eventual retirement from the workforce, when he finally starts to receive
that benefit. Suppose, for example, that a forty-five-year-old participant quit
his job in 1950 entitled to a defined benefit of $100 per month at his
retirement two decades hence. Twenty years later, then ready to retire, he
was entitled to this payout of $100 per month. While in nominal terms his
benefit had remained steady for two decades, in economic terms his
entitlement had eroded.
Even before ERISA there was, if the plan elected, an alternative
approach: Pay the employee his benefit as a lump sum on his termination of
employment rather than wait to commence payment upon his future
attainment of retirement age. Even prior to ERISA, such pre-retirement
distributions were common from defined contribution plans. However, this
approach was not without its drawbacks. In particular, under pre-ERISA
law, an employee had to pay tax on his pre-retirement distribution and on
the subsequent earnings generated by this distribution.59 While this early
taxation often occurred at relatively favorable rates, 60 such early taxation
was (often correctly) viewed as diminishing the ultimate resources available
for the participant's retirement.61
In light of these considerations, the drafters of ERISA, under the rubric
of "portability," sought a device that enabled the employee to carry his
benefit with him from job to job on a tax-advantaged basis and that allowed
him to earn additional income on that benefit as he moved toward
retirement. The mechanism ultimately devised to achieve such portability
was the individual retirement account.62 In particular, under ERISA, the
employee receiving a pre-retirement distribution from a qualified plan is
given the "rollover" option, i.e., the right to transfer his distribution tax free
59. The recipient of a pre-retirement distribution could have invested the proceeds of such
distribution in tax-favored investments, like municipal bonds. However, that kind of investment
choice typically entails an implicit tax in the form of a lower rate of return. E.g., WILLIAM A.
KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 184-86 (13th ed. 2003).
60. Before the adoption of ERISA, I.R.C. § 402(a)(2), § 402(a)(3)(C), and § 402(a)(5)
provided capital gain treatment to certain lump sum distributions. I.R.C. § 402(a)(2)-(3), (5)
(1970) (repealed 1974).
61. Much has been written on the consequences of tax deferral. Suffice it for these purposes
to observe that the deferral of income taxation until retirement typically generates two benefits for
the retiree: a higher after-tax return on investment earnings because these earnings are untaxed
prior to retirement and a lower tax bracket on distribution because the retiree is then no longer
working. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 4, at 229-34; Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in
Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money, "95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986).
62. See I.R.C. § 408 (2000).
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to an IRA.63 Once in the IRA, those funds grow tax free; income tax is not
payable until the participant finally withdraws his funds from the IRA to
which those funds were previously transferred without tax.64
The architects of ERISA also used the IRA to address the problem of
workers not covered by pensions at their workplaces. In particular,
ERISA's drafters envisioned the IRA as a mini-pension plan under which
workers without employer-provided pension coverage could make tax-
deductible contributions from their own earnings for their own retirements.
Such tax-deductible contributions were initially limited to $1500 per year
65
and were permitted only if the taxpayer was not an "active participant" in
an employer-based qualified plan.66
With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that the IRA was destined to
play a more critical role in American life than its crafters had anticipated. In
four respects, the IRA proved to be a crucial, albeit unintended, step toward
the defined contribution society. First, in a world of employee mobility, the
rollover process stimulated a long-term shift of retirement savings from
employer plans to IRAs. The availability of the IRA as a rollover device
encouraged plans to eschew annuity-style payouts and instead to distribute
lump sums, transferable tax free to departing participants' IRAs. The
existence of the IRA and its rollover feature similarly prompted employees
to accept such lump sums and to convey them tax free to their IRAs. Thus,
over time, pension-based wealth was destined to migrate from employer-
sponsored plans to the IRAs of former employees. Second, as I discuss
below, the emergence of the IRA as a central feature of the finances of
middle- and upper-middle-class families was accelerated during the early
years of the Reagan Administration by the use of the IRA as a nearly
universal vehicle for tax-deductible savings. Third, as I also discuss below,
the IRA model, embraced initially for retirement savings, proved adaptable
to medical and educational savings. Finally, the often successful
63. Id. § 402(c). The rollover provisions of the Code have undergone many changes since the
original version enacted by ERISA, including the authorization of trustee-to-trustee rollovers
under 1.R.C. § 401(a)(31)(A). These changes do not affect the basic point in the text: the decision
by ERISA's drafters to use the IRA to address the issue of portability.
64. Id. § 408(d)(1), (e)(1).
65. The original ERISA limit on IRA contributions was the lesser of $1500 or fifteen percent
of the participant's compensation. I.R.C. § 219(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975) (amended 1981). As
discussed below, the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981 increased the $1500 limit to
$2000. The $2000 limit on IRA contributions then remained in effect until the Economic Growth
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA) of 2001 provided for scheduled increases in that
limit through 2008, cost-of-living increases thereafter, and additional "catch up" contributions for
persons fifty years of age and older. In 2004, the basic IRA deduction is $3000 annually and
catch-up contributions are permitted for an additional $500. I.R.C. § 219(b) (2000), as amended
by Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA) of 2001 § 60 1(a), Pub. L.
No. 107-16, 2001 U.S.C.C.A.N. (115 Stat.) 38, 94 (2001).
66. See I.R.C. § 219(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975) (amended 1981).
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experiences of Americans with IRAs reinforced an individual account
culture that, by molding the expectations of employees, bolstered the
transformation of employer-based pension and fringe benefit plans to the
individual account format.
As we have seen, employers had their own incentives to move from the
defined benefit to the defined contribution motif: to shift investment,
funding, and longevity risk to their employees; to avoid ERISA's heavier
regulation of defined benefit pensions; and to embrace greater flexibility for
their qualified plans. The emergence of the IRA acclimated employees to
individual accounts so that the switch from employer-sponsored defined
benefit pensions to employer-sponsored individual account plans (a switch
that employees might otherwise have resisted) seemed normal, indeed
inevitable. The IRA thus proved critical on the path toward the defined
contribution paradigm by acclimating Americans to the individual account
format.
2. ERISA's Regulatory Burdens on Defined Benefit Plans
Another way in which ERISA proved critical on the path toward the
defined contribution society was the heavier regulatory burdens it imposed
on defined benefit arrangements, burdens that discouraged the creation and
continuation of such arrangements. Much of ERISA applies equally to
individual account and defined benefit plans-for example, its minimum
vesting rules.67 These rules require that employees' interests in their
accrued benefits become nonforfeitable upon the completion of specific
periods of employment. Such rules, by increasing employee vesting and
thus employer costs, may lead some employers to eschew qualified plans
altogether. However, ERISA's vesting rules do not affect the choice
between the defined contribution and the defined benefit formats since the
rules apply equally to both.
On the other hand, parts of ERISA burden defined benefit plans more
68heavily than defined contribution ones. Most prominently, ERISA
imposes complex minimum funding requirements on defined benefit
plans. 69 These often opaque rules limit (and frequently eliminate) any
employer flexibility in the financing of defined benefit plans. Consequently,
in a bad year the employer sponsoring a defined benefit plan may find itself
67. I.R.C. § 411 (2000); ERISA § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2000).
68. ALICIA H. MUNNELL & ANNIKA SUNDItN, COMING UP SHORT: THE CHALLENGE OF
401(K) PLANS 9 (2004) ("Technically, ERISA's provisions applied to both defined benefit and
defined contribution plans. But the main thrust of the legislation was on the defined benefit
side.").
69. I.R.C. § 412; ERISA §§ 301-308, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086.
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locked into a pension-funding obligation it would rationally prefer to defer
to better times.7°
The minimum funding rules are not without plausible justifications:
Employees covered by defined benefit plans reasonably rely on the promise
of future benefits and the implicit assurance that those benefits are being
funded properly. The sound financing of projected pension benefits is
actuarially complex, leading to complicated calculations and, thus, a
complicated statute. 7' Because promised benefits are payable in the future,
it is tempting to promise those benefits now and leave to one's successor
the task of financing them; hence the need for legislation to assure that
promised benefits are funded currently.72 Whatever the merits of these
arguments, the minimum funding rules deprive the employer of much
(perhaps any) flexibility in the financing of defined benefit pensions. In
contrast, the employer sponsoring a profit-sharing plan retains far greater
flexibility 73 to contribute (or not) in any year and to decide how much to
contribute. 74 Moreover, the employer's obligations in the profit-sharing
context are simpler to understand.
Compliance with ERISA's minimum funding rules also entails
significant administrative costs for defined benefit arrangements,75 i.e.,
actuarial, accounting, and legal fees, costs to which many employers,
particularly smaller ones, are quite sensitive.
In short, the inflexibility, impenetrability, and administrative costs
associated with ERISA's defined benefit minimum funding rules are, for
70. JACK VANDERHEI & CRAIG COPELAND, ERISA AT 30: THE DECLINE OF PRIVATE-
SECTOR DEFINED BENEFIT PROMISES AND ANNUITY PAYMENTS? WHAT WILL IT MEAN? 8
(Employee Benefit Research Inst., Issue Brief No. 269, 2004) ("[D]efined benefit plans may not
allow plan sponsors to reduce or even eliminate contributions in a specific year.").
71. Between the often complex formulas for determining a participant's benefit and the
equally complex actuarial formulas for funding, it is in some ways appropriate to think of defined
benefit pension plans as the original complex financial instruments.
72. Ironically, concerns about systematic underfunding were, and still are today, most
compelling as to governmental defined benefit plans-which are exempted from ERISA's
minimum funding rules. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
73. For the long run, the employer's discretion to contribute to its profit-sharing plan is not
unbridled.
74. As I discuss infra, a common design today is for 401(k) plans to include an employer
match of the employees' salary reduction contributions. Unlike defined benefit funding
requirements, employers can suspend or reduce this match in difficult economic times-as many
employers do. See, e.g., Firms Cutting Contributions to 401(k)s, NEW HAVEN REG., Apr. 4, 2003,
at E4; Arleen Jacobius, More Plan Sponsors Do Away with 401(k) Match, PENSIONS &
INVESTMENTS, Aug. 18, 2003, at 4; Tightening the Belt, WALL ST. J., May 20, 2003, at B1 ("At
least a dozen major companies have temporarily reduced or suspended matching contributions to
401(k) plans since January 2002."). This flexibility stands in sharp contrast to the defined benefit
finding rules.
75. Norman P. Stein, An Alphabet Soup Agenda for Reform of the Internal Revenue Code and
ERISA Provisions Applicable to Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans, 56 SMU L. REV. 627,
641 (2003) ("Defined benefit plans are generally more costly to administer, in large part because
of the need to engage the services of an actuary.").
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many employers, a significant deterrent to establishing or continuing
defined benefit plans, particularly when those rules are contrasted with the
greater flexibility, transparency, and simplicity of the rules governing
profit-sharing plans, including 401 (k) plans.76
Another cost ERISA imposes on only defined benefit plans is premium
payments to the PBGC, the government-operated insurance entity, which
resembles the FDIC and which insures basic pension benefits. 77 Here,
again, plausible arguments can be mounted to defend the PBGC, as can a
serious critique.78 My purpose is not to evaluate the pros and cons of the
PBGC but rather to observe the impact of PBGC premiums on an
employer's choice between a defined benefit plan and a defined
contribution arrangement. Because the PBGC covers only the former and
not the latter, PBGC premiums impose an additional cost on the defined
benefit option in contradistinction to an uninsured individual account plan.
To the extent employers must absorb these extra costs, those costs deter
the creation and continuation of defined benefit plans. Even if these costs
can be passed on to employees in the form of reduced wages, they are likely
to give employers pause. Insofar as employees appreciate the advantages of
an insured benefit, they might accept lower cash wages as a reasonable
price to pay for insured defined benefit coverage. However, insofar as
employees do not presently value either their participation in a defined
benefit plan or PBGC insurance coverage, lower cash wages put the
employer at a competitive disadvantage in the labor market.79 Moreover, to
the extent the employer maintaining a defined benefit plan attracts
employees who value defined benefit coverage, the employer is likely to
lure older employees and the longevity risks associated with a self-selected
workforce attracted to a classic defined benefit annuity by the expectation
of long life spans.
80
76. As Patrick Purcell has pointed out, in the years immediately after the enactment of
ERISA, the number of defined benefit pensions actually increased. Purcell, supra note 52, at 54
("Between 1975 and 1983, the number of [defined benefit] plans increased from 103,346 to
172,642."). By some measures, the decline of the defined benefit system commenced in earnest
after the adoption of § 40 1(k) in 1978. I find it plausible, as indicated in the text, to conclude that
the subsequent adoption of § 401(k) had a synergistic effect, compounding ERISA's regulatory
impact on defined benefit plans by creating an attractive alternative (the 401(k) plan) for
employers. However, it seems likely that, in the long run, ERISA's regulation of defined benefit
plans discouraged the maintenance and creation of defined benefit plans, independently of the
existence of the 401(k) alternative.
77. ERISA §§ 4001-4071, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1371 (2000); see also Daniel Keating, Chapter
I 's New Ten-Ton Monster: The PBGC and Bankruptcy, 77 MINN. L. REV. 803, 806 (1993).
78. See, e.g., IPPOLITO, supra note 29, at 14-15.
79. See Halperin, supra note 15, at 41.
80. See supra Section II.C.
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While PBGC premiums may not be large in absolute dollar terms,81
they nevertheless have a disproportionate impact on smaller employers that
are particularly sensitive to professional fees and other administrative
costs82 and consequently are discouraged from establishing or maintaining
defined benefit pensions by such expenses. The resulting tendency of small
employers to abandon the defined benefit format is significant, both
because most American workers are employed by small employers and
because some small employers become large employers.
Many employers, particularly smaller firms, responded to the
regulatory burdens imposed by ERISA by abandoning qualified plans
altogether. Others responded to the heavier burdens placed on defined
benefit plans by shifting to less heavily regulated defined contribution
devices. This shift gave an important impetus to the defined contribution
paradigm as employers and employees came to experience and thus
conceive of retirement savings in individual account terms.
3. ERISA 's Fiduciary Rules and Participant-Directed Accounts
ERISA's third step down the road toward a defined contribution society
was the decision embraced in the statute to permit sponsors of defined
contribution plans to authorize employees to direct the investment of their
own accounts. 83 Such self-directed investment largely relieves the employer
(or, to be precise, the trustee the employer has designated) of the otherwise
substantial fiduciary obligations stemming from the responsibility for
investing the plan's assets.84
A central feature of ERISA was the imposition upon trustees managing
plan assets of federal fiduciary standards based on the traditional
obligations of trustees: the duties of loyalty, prudence, and diversification.85
In some states, state law, even without ERISA, imposed upon pension
trustees the traditional duties of trustees and the time-honored sanctions for
81. For a fully funded defined benefit plan, the premium is $19 per participant per year. 29
U.S.C. § 1306(a)(3)(A). For an underfunded plan., there is an additional premium of $9 per $ 1000
of unfunded vested benefits. Id. § 1306(a)(3)(E).
82. See Stein, supra note 75, at 641.
83. ERISA § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c).
84. Under the Department of Labor's interpretation, ERISA section 404(c) relieves a plan
fiduciary of liability for a participant's investment decisions only if the plan satisfies certain
regulatory requirements designed to ensure that each participant has a meaningful
"opportunity... to exercise control over assets in his individual account." 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-
l(b)(1)(i) (2004). Additionally, the regulatory requirements mandate "an opportunity to choose,
from a broad range of investment alternatives, the manner in which some or all of the assets in his
account are invested." Id. § 2550.404c-1(b)(1)(ii).
85. ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1); see also LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 4,
at 678-82; John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable ": The Supreme Court's Trail of
Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1317, 1321-38 (2003).
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violating those duties. 86 However, even in those states, ERISA's
federalization of the fiduciary obligations of pension trustees gave those
obligations a new salience. And, as to those states in which the fiduciary
responsibilities of pension trustees were less well articulated, ERISA was
reasonably perceived as imposing new burdens on such trustees.
There is, however, an important safety valve: Under ERISA section
404(c), if a defined contribution plan permits each employee to direct the
investment of the funds in his own account, the plan's trustee bears no
liability to the employee for investments,87 on the apparent assumption that
the employee is deciding for himself. Such participant direction of plan
investments is not feasible in the defined benefit context because the
defined benefit participant has no discrete subset of assets earmarked to him
that he can manage for himself. Rather, the defined benefit participant has a
claim for future benefits against the totality of a common fund.
Consider in this context the owner of a closely held corporation who,
before ERISA, acted as trustee of his company's defined benefit pension
plan. With ERISA heightening the salience and perhaps the substance of his
fiduciary obligations, this owner had three alternatives: continuing to serve
as trustee with those obligations, hiring a professional trustee for the plan,
or terminating the defined benefit plan and replacing it with a self-directed
defined contribution plan. For at least some employers, the self-directed
defined contribution plan proved the best choice, because it shifted the
investment function to the plan participants and consequently shifted
fiduciary liability away from the owner-trustee.
4. The Ten Percent Limit on Employer Stock
Finally, ERISA established a strict numerical limit on the amount of
the sponsoring employer's stock that may be held for a defined benefit plan,
capping such stock holdings at ten percent of total plan assets.88 In contrast,
ERISA enacted no such numerical limit on the employer stock held for
individual account plans. 89 As l'affaire Enron demonstrated, many
86. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Mayor of Balt., 562 A.2d 720, 734 (Md. 1989) (noting that "the
pension contracts incorporate the Trustees' common-law duties of prudence and loyalty" for
governmental pension plan not regulated by ERISA).
87. Subject to compliance with the regulatory requirements to insure the participant a
meaningful opportunity to make his investment choices. See supra note 84.
88. ERISA § 407(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(2).
89. ERISA § 407(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1 07(b)(1). In the wake of the Enron affair, Congress
adopted ERISA section 407(b)(2), which applies the ten percent limit in cases where employees'
salary reduction contributions must be invested in the employer's stock. ERISA § 407(b)(2), 29
U.S.C. § 1107(b)(2). These are relatively rare cases. More typically, the employer contributes its
stock and the employees also voluntarily direct their own contributions to employer stock.
Consequently, ERISA section 407(b)(2) will have little practical effect.
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employers grasped this difference, established defined contribution plans,
and loaded them with quantities of employer stock that would not have
been permitted for defined benefit plans.
90
5. Demographic and Economic Changes Reinforcing ERISA's Effects
Demographic trends reinforced ERISA's negative impact on defined
benefit plans. Unions have been important advocates of the traditional
defined benefit plan. Indeed, a good predictor of whether a firm sponsors a
defined benefit plan is whether it has a collective bargaining agreement.91
Another good predictor of defined benefit sponsorship (often overlapping
with union membership) is whether the firm is engaged in traditional
manufacturing or extractive activity. 92 As union membership stagnated and
90. See Millon, supra note 2, at 839; Sharon Reece, Enron: The Final Straw & How To Build
Pensions of Brick, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 69, 116 (2002) ("Other companies have 401k assets similarly
invested in a high percentage of company stock."); Susan J. Stabile, Enron, Global Crossing, and
Beyond: Implications for Workers, 76 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 815, 820 (2002) ("In addition, we have
reached a point where the 401(k) plan accounts of a significant number of employees are bloated
with company stock.").
The question of why employers contribute their stock to qualified plans is not as simple as
first appears because the economic effect of contributing newly issued stock directly to the plan is
identical to the impact of contributing cash to the plan and then having the plan itself purchase
new stock from the corporation with that contributed cash. The employer derives no additional
monetary savings from a direct stock contribution as opposed to a cash contribution followed by
the plan's purchase of newly issued stock from the corporation with that cash.
Why, then, do corporations contribute their stock to their 401(k) plans rather than contribute
cash for stock purchases? I believe that such contributions are primarily intended to encourage
employees to invest their salary reduction contributions in the employer's stock. The employer's
direct contribution effectively endorses its stock as an investment. That endorsement, in turn,
influences employees to put their salary reduction contributions in the same investment. In short,
the corporate contribution of stock signals to the employees that they should direct their funds into
stock purchases.
There are three reasons why corporate management wants employees to invest their salary
reduction amounts in the employer's stock. First, when employees purchase newly issued stock, they
in effect rebate part of their compensation back to the employer. Suppose an employee is paid $10
and elects salary reduction for $1. If that $1 is returned to the corporation for newly issued stock, the
corporation has, in practice, paid the employee $9 and has the other $1 back to spend for corporate
purposes. Second, if the employees' salary reduction amounts are used to purchase stock in the open
market, those purchases increase demand for the employer's stock and hence elevate the price of that
stock. It is attractive to corporate management, particularly managers with stock options, to increase
the employer's stock price in this fashion. Third, corporate management perceives (often with good
reason) that stock owned by employees is in friendlier hands than if that stock were in the hands of
third parties.
91. Pension scholars have frequently noted the role of unions in the establishment and
maintenance of defined benefit plans. See, e.g., STEVEN A. SASS, THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE
PENSIONS: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 230 (1997).
92. See America's Pensions, supra note 41, at 55 ("Many defined benefit plans are in our
oldest and most capital intensive industries."); see also Lee A. Sheppard, Pension Benefit
Obligations: Twilight of the Household Names, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 13, 2004, 2003 TNT
198-5 (LEXIS) (discussing the financial problems of defined benefit plans maintained by "the
steel companies, the automobile and parts companies, and the airlines").
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2004]
as old-style manufacturing and mining declined in economic importance
(the two trends were intertwined), the defined benefit plan ebbed
accordingly. Conversely, as service industries, with no strong history of
unionization or of defined benefit sponsorship, grew in relative importance,
ERISA pushed the firms in those industries toward defined contribution
plans for their employees.93
Also diminishing the appeal of the traditional defined benefit pension
was the perception of greater employee mobility among firms. The
traditional defined benefit arrangement is particularly attractive for an
employee who spends his entire career with a single firm. In that instance,
the employee's salary and service history typically elevate the size of the
retirement annuity to which he is entitled. As previously observed, pension
experts frequently label traditional defined benefit plans "back-loaded,"
meaning that an employee must spend most of his career with one employer
to earn the particularly valuable benefits that accrue in his later years.
In contrast, a job-hopping employee rarely accumulates the kind of
earnings and work history with a single employer necessary to earn a
substantial annuity under a traditional defined benefit plan. Consequently, a
job-hopping employee is better off with a series of defined contribution
plans, because, every time he changes employers, he can roll over the
amount in his individual account to an IRA or to the next plan if the plan so
permits.
Whether employee mobility has actually increased is a matter of
controversy.95 However, undoubtedly real is the perception of greater
employee mobility and of the loss of stigma attached to frequent job
changes. Hence, defined contribution devices came to be favored by many
employers and employees as better adapted to a world of greater (or at least
more acceptable) employee mobility.
The upshot of these legislative and demographic forces was, after the
adoption of ERISA, the termination of defined benefit pension plans as
employers reassessed such plans in the new legal environment created by
the statute. In many instances, employers created defined contribution plans
to replace their terminated defined benefit arrangements. Moreover,
employers seeking to establish new qualified plans from scratch eschewed
93. MUNNELL & SUNDtN, supra note 68, at 26 ("Employment was declining in large,
unionized, manufacturing firms, which typically offered defined benefit plans, and was growing in
high-tech firms and small, nonunionized companies in the services and trade sectors, which
typically did not.").
94. See Zelinsky, supra note 4, at 688-91; supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
95. MUNNELL & SUNDEN, supra note 68, at 43 ("Economists who have studied trends in
mobility have split into two camps, one that supports the popular view of increased mobility and
another that disputes it.").
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the defined benefit configuration and instead opted for individual account
arrangements, particularly profit-sharing plans.
Many of the defined benefit plans terminated in the wake of ERISA
were maintained by small and professional employers. Some observers
dismissed these defined benefit pensions as tax shelters for high-income
earners and consequently viewed the demise of these plans with
equanimity. 96 However, for two reasons, the death of the small-employer
defined benefit plan had important long-term consequences. First, small
firms, in the aggregate, employ much of the workforce. 97 Second, some
small employers become large employers; when firms establish money
purchase pension and profit-sharing plans in their early years, they tend to
stay with such plans later.
In short, ERISA, without anyone intending it that way, laid the
grounding for the defined contribution society, both by authorizing the IRA
and by placing burdens on defined benefit plans that discouraged the
creation and maintenance of such plans. ERISA thereby shifted employers
toward the defined contribution model.98
B. Section 401(k)
The next critical event for the emergence of the defined contribution
paradigm was the adoption of I.R.C. § 401(k) and the regulations
implementing that section. Today, we are so used to thinking of the now-
ubiquitous 401(k) account as a retirement savings device that it is easy to
forget § 401(k)'s origins in the tax problem of constructive receipt. An
endemic problem of the federal income tax is taxpayers' manipulation of
the cash method of accounting.99 In its classic incarnation, that
96. This attitude persists among influential commentators today. See, e.g., Stein, supra note
75, at 654 (noting that small-employer defined benefit "plans are inconsistent with the
justification for the tax subsidy, since they operate to weight benefits toward highly compensated
employees and away from the lower and middle-income employees, who are the primary target of
the tax expenditures").
97. PATRICK J. PURCELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE RL30122, PENSIONS AND
RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLANS: SPONSORSHIP AND PARTICIPATION 4 (2003) ("Encouraging
sponsorship of retirement plans by small firms is an important issue to the Congress in part
because of the large number of people employed by small businesses. In 2002, for example, more
than 34 million people worked for firms with fewer than 25 employees.").
98. Professor Kaplan's analysis is similar. Kaplan, supra note 19, at 63 ("There are several
reasons for this shift from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans, including (1)
absence of PBGC premiums, (2) no actuarial expenses, (3) fewer compliance costs due to less
burdensome regulations, and (4) the structural transformation of the American economy from
unionized manufacturing companies to service sector operations and high technology enterprises."
(footnote omitted)).
99. That manipulation and the doctrines developed to combat it (including constructive
receipt) are important topics in virtually all introductory casebooks on the federal income tax. See,
e.g., KLEIN ET AL., supra note 59, at 251-78.
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manipulation takes the form of a high-bracket cash method taxpayer
ignoring income available to him in the current year to shift that income
into subsequent years in which his marginal rate will be lower. To combat
perceived abuses along these lines, the doctrine of constructive receipt taxes
this cash method taxpayer in his high-bracket year when the income was
constructively received, i.e., when he could have taken it had he not
manipulated the cash method.'00
In the context of qualified retirement plans, consider an employer who
establishes a plan with what is sometimes called a "cash or deferred"
provision, sometimes also called a salary reduction arrangement. Under
such a provision, the employer's plan gives the employee an election
between full salary (all currently taxable to the employee as current
compensation) and reduced salary with the difference contributed by the
employer to the qualified plan. If the tax system respects the employee's
election to receive reduced salary and for the employer to make a
corresponding plan contribution, the employee shifts a portion of her
otherwise available income from the current year to the future, when she
receives her plan distribution and is likely to be in a lower tax bracket-
precisely the harm at which the doctrine of constructive receipt is aimed.
Not surprisingly, the IRS and the Treasury had serious misgivings
about these elective salary reduction arrangements, while employers
defended them. The issue proved so contentious that the drafters of ERISA
postponed it for future resolution. 10 ' Finally, in 1978, Congress acted in a
way that inadvertently but decisively accelerated the trend toward the
defined contribution culture.
102
Congress's decision-embodied in § 401(k) of the Code-condoned
salary reduction arrangements and the tax deferral they entail. Specifically,
§ 401(k) permits elective cash-or-deferred arrangements in profit-sharing
plans if the higher-paid portion of the employer's workforce participates in
such arrangements at levels roughly proportional to the participation rates
of rank-and-file employees. For these purposes, § 401(k) originally divided
the sponsoring employer's covered employees into the highest-paid one-
third and the rest. For each member of both groups, § 401(k) requires the
100. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.4 51-2(a) (as amended in 1979) ("Income although not actually
reduced to a taxpayer's possession is constructively received by him in the taxable year during
which it is credited to his account, set apart for him, or otherwise made available so that he may
draw upon it at any time, or so that he could have drawn upon it during the taxable year if notice
of intention to withdraw had been given.").
101. See ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2006, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. (88 Stat. 829, 992-93) 935,
1136-38.
102. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 135, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat.)
2763, 2785-87 (codified at I.R.C. § 401(k) (2000)); see also Stein, supra note 75, at 659
(discussing the events leading to "the 401(k) revolution").
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calculation of an "actual deferral percentage," that is, the percentage of the
employee's compensation electively converted into an employer
contribution to the plan. As long as the average actual deferral percentage
of the highest-paid third of the workforce does not exceed the actual
deferral percentage of the remaining employees by more than the statutorily
permitted limits, 0 3 the plan and its cash-or-deferred arrangement are
respected for tax purposes.1
0 4
Section 401(k) was effective for 1980 and, once implemented through
Treasury regulations,10 5 resulted in the rapid growth of what, quite sensibly,
became known as 401(k) plans, i.e., profit-sharing plans with qualified
cash-or-deferred arrangements. Two features of typical 401(k) plans
enhanced their popularity. First, employers often augment their cash-or-
deferred arrangements with matching formulas. 0 6 Under such formulas, if
the employee converts one dollar of otherwise taxable salary into one
dollar of plan contribution, the employer matches that contribution with
additional funds.'
0 7
Second, 401(k) plans typically provide for self-directed investments,
with the participant allocating the funds in his own account among the
available alternatives. An important feature of participant-directed
accounts, we have seen,'08 is that, per ERISA section 404(c), fiduciary
liability largely abates for the plan trustee because the self-directing
participant is investing for himself109 For the financial services industry,
self-directed plans have proven an attractive product, with the industry
providing a panoply of services such as plan documents, investment advice
to employees, and the actual investments themselves, including the means
for employees to switch their allocations, often quite frequently. The 401 (k)
plan and its self-directed accounts have accordingly become an important
(perhaps the important) retail product of the financial services industry.'1 10
103. I.R.C. § 401(k)(3)(A) (2000).
104. Congress later amended § 401(k) to define the group of higher-paid employees as those
employees who are highly compensated within the meaning of I.R.C. § 414(q). Congress also
gave § 401(k) plans the alternative of complying with so-called "safe harbor" rules. I.R.C.
§ 401(k)(12).
105. The regulations today appear at Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401(k)-O to -1 (as amended in 1994,
1995).
106. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 19, at 67 ("[M]any employers with 401(k) plans provide
'matching' funds; i.e., they supplement the employee's 401(k) deferral with employer funds.").
107. Congress subsequently imposed upon such matching contributions rules similar to those
of§ 401(k). I.R.C. § 401(m).
108. See supra Subsection III.A.3.
109. To receive the protection of ERISA section 404(c), the plan's fiduciaries must comply
with regulatory requirements designed to guarantee that the participants' right to invest is
meaningful, both substantively and procedurally. See supra notes 84-87.
110. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 767, 789 (2002) ("As the Baby Boomer generation has become poised to
pressure the Social Security system, self-directed retirement plans have increased in size and
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The insurance industry played a critical role in the early stages of the
private pension system, encouraging firms to establish plans and to fund
such plans with the industry's insurance and annuity products.,' Banks
have long served as trustees and financial advisors for corporate pension
and profit-sharing plans. 1 2 Thus, at one level, the role of the financial
services industry in promoting 401(k) arrangements merely extended a
historic pattern. At another level, however, the role of that industry
hastened the shift toward the defined contribution paradigm as the financial
services industry became a major advocate of and advertiser for 401(k)
plans and IRAs.
One way of describing the services provided to 401(k) plans and their
participants is that these services are the diseconomies of scale that result
from decentralized investing, the diseconomies avoided under the defined
benefit format with its centralized investment of a common pool of capital.
That, needless to say, has not been the perspective advanced by the
financial services industry, which has instead emphasized the investment
autonomy of the individual 401 (k) participant and IRA holder.
C. ERTA and TRA86: Expanded Availability of IRAs and the Financial
Services Industry
As § 401(k) accelerated the shift to the defined contribution paradigm,
the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981,'13 championed by
President Reagan, further reinforced that shift by converting the IRA into
something approximating a universal savings vehicle. Reagan was
committed, depending upon one's perspective, to the encouragement of tax-
favored savings or to the elimination of the income tax bias against savings.
Reflecting these concerns, ERTA liberalized ERISA's rules for tax-
deductible IRA contributions by permitting any person with earned income
(even if covered by a qualified plan at work) to establish an IRA and to
make tax-deductible contributions to that IRA up to $2000 per person'14
availability. People now want to take individual responsibility for their financial needs,
particularly in retirement. The market for investment services eagerly meets the demand."); see
also FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM 200-01 (2003) ("Anyone with a pension
account knows that the entire financial business now revolves around selling products to people
like him or her.").
11. See SASS, supra note 91, at 154 ("[T]he insurance companies were the most active
providers of pension services through the years of depression and war .....
112. See id. at 155.
113. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. (95 Stat.)
172 (codified in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
114. ERTA limited IRA contributions to the amount of the individual's compensation for the
year. Thus, IRA contributions were only available to taxpayers with earned income. I.R.C.
§ 219(b) (2000).
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ERTA thus transformed the IRA from a response to the coverage and
portability problems to a virtually' 15 universal savings vehicle, even as the
IRA continued to address the portability issue via the rollover rules.
It is interesting to speculate in what form ERTA would have passed
Congress had ERISA not created the IRA seven years earlier. Perhaps, in
deference to President Reagan's views, something like the IRA would have
been created from scratch in 1981 to serve as a general, tax-favored savings
vehicle. Alternatively, in a world without the IRA, perhaps Reagan would
not have succeeded in extending taxpayers' ability to save on a tax-
deductible basis. From this vantage, that the IRA both existed and was
easily adaptable to Reagan's vision may have facilitated an otherwise
unobtainable alteration of the tax law; what would have seemed an abrupt
change instead appeared incremental given the preexistence of the IRA. In
any event, the IRA was at hand and became the vehicle for Reagan's goal
of a more savings-friendly tax code.
Even without the enactment of ERTA, the amounts held in IRAs would,
with the passage of time, have increased as more individuals received plan
distributions and rolled them over into IRAs. However, ERTA, by
permitting anyone with earned income to contribute to an IRA on a tax-
deductible basis, caused an immediate and explosive growth in the number
of IRAs and in the amounts they held-which, of course, is what President
Reagan and those who supported this aspect of ERTA intended.
Between the adoption of ERISA in the mid-1970s and the effective date
of ERTA (January 1, 1982), relatively few individuals had established IRAs
for coverage purposes, i.e., to make tax-deductible contributions in the
absence of pension participation at the workplace. This is not surprising
given the correlation among higher incomes, pension coverage, and ability
to save. Those covered by qualified plans tend to be the better-paid
participants in the workforce; correspondingly, those without employment-
based pension coverage tend to be lower-paid workers who, by virtue of
their lesser incomes, are poorly positioned to save via IRA contributions or
otherwise. 116 Moreover, the IRA was a novel device and initially lacked
Treasury regulations to clarify the inevitable concerns that arise under a
new and complex statute. The upshot was that, in the period immediately
after ERISA's adoption, relatively few persons availed themselves of the
opportunity to make deductible contributions to IRAs, because persons
without work-based pension coverage (before ERTA, the only persons
115. As noted above, the taxpayer needed earned income to make deductible IRA
contributions.
116. See PURCELL, supra note 97, at Summary ("Workers who earned less than $20,000 in
2002 were just one-third as likely as those who earned $60,000 or more to have participated in a
retirement plan at work."); Medill, supra note 18, at 919.
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permitted tax-deductible IRA contributions) tend to be low-income
individuals who find it difficult to save, even with a tax incentive, and
because the novelty and uncertainties of the IRA initially deterred some,
perhaps many, individuals who might otherwise have established such
accounts.
ERTA radically changed the dynamic of the IRA, making tax-
deductible contributions available to middle- and upper-income taxpayers
even if they had employment-based pension coverage. This caused a
quantum growth in the number of persons with IRAs and in the amounts
held in those accounts. In 1981, the last year before ERTA became
effective, slightly more than 3 million taxpayers had IRAs. In 1982, the first
year ERTA was in force, the number of taxpayers with IRAs almost
quadrupled, to 12 million.'17 The corresponding increase in total IRA assets
was even more dramatic, from slightly less than $5 billion in 1981 to more
than $28 billion in 1982.118
Much ink has been spilled arguing whether this growth in IRA assets
reflected new, additional savings or, rather, the diversion to IRAs of
existing savings or of savings that would have occurred anyway. 19 For
purposes of this Article, however, this dispute is irrelevant: Whether the
ERTA-stimulated growth of IRA assets in the early 1980s reflected new net
savings or not, that growth turned the IRA from a device of limited utility
into a national institution, widely used by middle- and upper-income
taxpayers. As a result, millions of Americans for the first time experienced
retirement savings as individual accounts rather than as employer-
guaranteed defined benefits. This spread and reinforced the defined
contribution paradigm.
Moreover, the ERTA-based growth of the IRA further ensconced the
financial services industry as a key supporter of the defined contribution
paradigm as it exists today. 20 With ERTA's embrace of near-universal IRA
availability and the simultaneous emergence of the self-directed 401(k)
account, the financial services industry aggressively promoted the
retirement savings business on a retail basis, serving individuals as IRA
owners as well as 401(k) participants. As Fareed Zakaria has observed,
117. Edward A. Zelinsky, ERISA and the Emergence of the Defined Contribution Society, in
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY-PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-SEVENTH INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL
TAXATION: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION § 6.01, at 6-1, § 6.03, at 6-12
n.33 (Alvin D. Lurie ed., 1999).
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., JAMES M. POTERBA ET AL., THE TRANSITION TO PERSONAL ACCOUNTS AND
INCREASING RETIREMENT WEALTH: MACRO AND MICRO EVIDENCE (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 8610, 2001).
120. See Cunningham, supra note 110, at 789; see also ZAKARIA, supra note 110, at 199-205
(describing the rise of financial services for the masses).
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"Introduced only twenty-five years ago, IRAs and 401(k) plans are now the
mechanisms through which most Americans participate in the stock and
bond markets."'12'
The promotion of IRAs by the financial services industry did not
diminish when Congress, in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86),
severely curtailed ERTA's expansion of taxpayers' ability to make tax-
deductible IRA contributions. 122 The central policy of TRA86, also Reagan-
inspired, was a significant reduction of federal income tax rates in return for
a broadening of the tax base. As part of that policy, TRA86 restricted, on
the basis of income, the ability of taxpayers covered by employment-based
qualified plans to make tax-deductible IRA contributions. 
2 3
TRA86 thus restored the IRA to a role closer to that originally
embodied in ERISA: Taxpayers without employment-based qualified plan
coverage could, regardless of income, use the IRA on a tax-deductible basis
as a substitute for workplace pension coverage. The IRA's rollover function
continued unimpaired. However, nondeductible IRA contributions did not
prove particularly attractive, while lower-income families generally could
not afford the supplemental savings of deductible IRA contributions.
For the emergence of the defined contribution paradigm, TRA86's
restoration of the IRA to something closer to its original role was less
important than might have been predicted. During the five-year period
(1982 through 1986) during which ERTA expanded to near universality the
availability of deductible IRA contributions, enormous sums were placed
into IRAs. These sums had to be managed even if no further amounts were
being contributed. Even when IRA owners were precluded from further tax-
deductible contributions (as many were by TRA86), they continued to hold
and manage those accounts. Between Congress' decision to condone cash-
or-deferred arrangements under § 401(k) and ERTA's five-year expansion
of the IRA, the defined contribution genie was out of the bottle.
By the 1980s, the defined benefit system was stagnating. Virtually no
new defined benefit plans were being created. 124 Many had been (and were
being) terminated. Simultaneously, less heavily regulated defined
contribution devices-in particular, 401(k) arrangements and IRAs-were
thriving. For many individuals, the individual account format worked well.
A paradigm shift was underway that, by the end of the century, would
121. ZAKARIA, supra note 110, at 204.
122. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1101, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.)
2085, 2411-14 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 219(e), (g) (2000)).
123. Id.
124. According to the Employee Benefit Research Institute, there were over 128,000 defined
benefit plans in 1978. By 2003, the number of defined benefit plans had declined to 26,000.
Employee Benefit Research Inst., Historical Statistics, http://www.ebri.org/policyforums/
may2004/hbstats.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2004).
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transform the way in which Americans save for retirement. As Patrick
Purcell has observed, "Considering that IRAs were first authorized by
Congress in 1974, and that the first 401(k) plan was established just 22
years ago in 1981, some might find it quite astonishing that by 2000 more
than 47 million Americans owned one or more of these retirement savings
accounts." 25
In some ways, the most interesting manifestation of the growing grip of
the defined contribution paradigm was the legislative response to
employers' increasingly vociferous complaints that Congress, by its
cumulative regulation of qualified plans, had made such plans too complex
for many (particularly smaller) employers. Rather than embracing the most
straightforward response to the problem of overregulation, i.e.,
deregulating, Congress instead added to the Code provisions for "simplified
employee pensions"'26 and "simple retirement accounts. 127 These devices
authorized employer contributions to employees' IRAs as a substitute for
regular pension contributions-and thereby further extended employers'
and employees' experiences with such accounts.
D. Flexible Spending Accounts and Medical Savings Accounts
Given the shift to the individual account paradigm for retirement
savings, it was perhaps inevitable that Congress would extend this
paradigm to other areas of tax and social policy. An initial step in that
direction occurred in the early 1980s with the institutionalization of the
"flexible spending account" (FSA). Like the 401(k) plan, the origins of the
FSA can be traced to the question of employment-based constructive
receipt: If an employer offers an employee a choice of either a tax-free
fringe benefit or taxable cash compensation, does the employee electing the
fringe benefit constructively receive taxable income because he had the
option to take taxable cash? As a statutory matter, Congress answered with
a qualified "no," decreeing in I.R.C. § 125 that, pursuant to a
nondiscriminatory "cafeteria plan," an employer can offer employees the
choice between cash compensation and certain fringe benefits with the
fringe benefits retaining their tax-free status.
Thus was born the FSA, an individual account by which the employee
can elect to divert a portion of his compensation to certain fringe benefit
programs on a tax-favored basis. Notwithstanding the Treasury's efforts to
125. Purcell, supra note 52, at 66.
126. I.R.C. § 408(k) (2000).
127. Id. § 408(p).
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restrain FSAs, 128 these have become popular with employers, particularly as
a way of permitting employees to defray their copayments for medical
coverage on a pretax basis.129 The FSA thus further acclimated working
Americans to the individual account experience, broadening that experience
beyond retirement savings.
In 1996 and 1997, Congress took further, indeed decisive, steps in the
expansion of individual accounts. Again, no one heralded these steps as
furthering a significant transformation of tax and social policy. Each step
was taken as a discrete response to a particular problem. Cumulatively,
however, the result was, first, the extension of the defined contribution
configuration to the funding of education and of medical care and, second,
adaptation of the individual account design to provide for tax-free
withdrawals coupled with nondeductible contributions. Among these
devices that extended and reinforced the defined contribution format was
the "medical savings account" (MSA).
Congress added the MSA to the Code as part of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.130 The MSA adapts the IRA
model to medical care. An employee or self-employed person establishes an
MSA by making tax-deductible contributions to an MSA, subject to dollar
limits; those contributions grow tax free; and amounts are withdrawn from
the MSA to defray the medical expenses of the employee and his family.
However, the MSA differs from the IRA in ways that reflect, inter alia,
the vagaries of tax policy, interest group influence, and ideological
concerns. Withdrawals from MSAs for medical expenses are (unlike
distributions from conventional IRAs) tax free. In this way, MSAs mimic
the highly favorable tax treatment of employer-provided medical care under
128. Long-pending Treasury regulations under § 125 embody the so-called "use it or lose it"
principle: The holder of an FSA must use the balance in her account by the end of the year for the
fringe benefit she selects or must forfeit any remaining funds in the account. See, e.g., Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.125-1, Q&A 7, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,321 (May 7, 1984) ("For example, a plan that offers
participants the opportunity to purchase vacation days (or to receive cash or other benefits under
the plan in lieu of vacation days) will not be a cafeteria plan if participants who purchase the
vacation days for a plan year are allowed to use any unused days in a subsequent plan year.").
Technically, these proposed regulations have been pending since 1984. De facto, these
regulations today serve as part of the legal framework governing FSAs. See Julie A. Roin, United
They Stand, Divided They Fall: Public Choice Theory and the Tax Code, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 62,
101-08 (1988); Letter from Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Senate Fin. Comm., to John W. Snow,
Sec'y of the Treasury (Aug. 23, 2004), reprinted in Grassley Urges Treasury To Rewrite FSA
"Use It or Lose It " Rule, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 24, 2004, 2004 TNT 164-21 (LEXIS).
129. See, e.g., Eileen Alt Powell, Flexible Spending Accounts Help Consumers Cover Health,
Child Care Costs, NEW HAVEN REG., Oct. 20, 2003, at A6.
130. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
§ 301, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1936, 2037 (codified at I.R.C. § 220 (2000)). Congress
subsequently renamed these accounts "Archer Medical Savings Accounts." Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. G, § 202, 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. (114 Stat.)
2763, 2763A-628 to -629 (2000).
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which premiums are tax deductible to the employer13 1 and tax free to the
employee 132 while the payments received by the employee for medical
outlays are also tax free.' 33 In addition, MSAs are available only to self-
employed persons who purchase "high deductible" medical insurance to
cover large, nonroutine medical outlays and to persons whose employers
purchase such insurance for them. 134 Thus, in the final analysis, the MSA is
a device for defraying day-to-day medical expenses with insurance
coverage triggered for larger expenditures. An employee can establish an
MSA only if he works for a small employer, generally defined as a firm
with fifty or fewer employees. The total number of MSAs that can be
established nationwide is capped at 750,000; after reaching that number, no
more MSAs will be established.1
35
This network of limitations in part reflects the clash of interest groups
and, more interestingly, ideological tensions between the individualized
vision underlying the defined contribution paradigm and the preference for
group risk pooling embodied in the defined benefit format. Opponents of
MSAs often decry the political influence of insurers offering high-
deductible insurance coverage.136 MSAs, permitted only if the insured has
such coverage, obviously stimulate such insurers' business. On the other
hand, full-service insurance companies must consider the MSA a threat to
both their routine claims-processing business and to the standard, low-
deductible policies they sell. Since the MSA shifts responsibility for paying
claims to the account holder who withdraws from the MSA what he needs
to pay, there is, as to those claims, no longer a need for the claims-
processing services of the full-service insurer. Moreover, those insurers'
standard policies cannot be purchased by MSA holders, who can purchase
only high-deductible policies. One need not be a devotee of public choice
theory to see that, just as the establishment in the Code of the MSA
131. I.R.C. § 162(a).
132. Id. § 106.
133. Id. § 105(b).
134. Id. § 220(c)(1)(A)(iii). An individual can establish an MSA if her spouse is employed by
a small employer maintaining a high-deductible policy or if her spouse is self-employed.
135. For a more detailed review of the rules governing MSAs, see Danshera Cords,
Comment, The Medical Savings Account Provision of the HIPAA: Is It Sound Health and Tax
Policy?, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1217 (1998).
136. See EDWIN PARK & IRIS J. LAV, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, PROPOSED
EXPANSION OF MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS COULD DRIVE UP INSURANCE COSTS AND
INCREASE THE NUMBER OF UNINSURED 2 (2003), available at http://www.cbpp.org/4-30-
03health.pdf ("These MSA expansions have long been pushed by insurance companies that sell
MSA policies and conservative policy institutions."); see also Martin A. Sullivan, Economic
Analysis: The Side Effects of Health Savings Accounts, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 21, 2003, 2003
TNT 140-8 (LEXIS) ("To this day, Rooney and the Golden Rule Insurance Co. are the leading
supporters of efforts to expand medical saving accounts. The company has spent millions of
dollars on lobbying expenses and campaign contributions-mostly to Republicans.").
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reflected in important part the political heft of the insurers that sell high-
deductible coverage, the statutory limits on MSAs similarly protect other
insurers' claims-processing and standard policy-selling businesses, by
limiting both the size of MSAs and the number of MSAs that can be
established.
These statutory limits on MSAs also reflect the ideological fault lines of
the defined contribution society. Medical insurance (whether of the
indemnity or managed care variety) is the health care analogue to a defined
benefit pension. Just as defined benefit plans pool employees and their
claims and assign risk and reward to the sponsoring employer, medical
insurance pools insureds into a covered group and allocates risk and reward
to the insurer.137 If those covered by medical insurance in the aggregate
spend less on medical care than had been predicted, the difference inures to
the insurer; conversely, greater-than-expected outlays for the insured group
are the insurer's problem. Similarly, if the insurer generates more income
than anticipated from the investment of premiums, that profit accrues to the
insurer-as does poorer-than-expected investment experience. Within the
group of insureds, insurance pools the risks of unexpectedly bad health
much as defined benefit plans pool longevity risk for members of the
covered workforce.
Just as defined contribution retirement devices (i.e., self-directed 401(k)
accounts and IRAs) privatize decisions about retirement savings, MSAs
assign to the individual account holder responsibility for her routine
medical outlays and for investing the assets in her MSA account. Such
responsibility is crucial for MSA advocates who contend that that
responsibility makes consumers of health care more sensitive to the cost of
such care, leading them to economize their use of medical resources and to
shop for less expensive medical services.
In light of these similarities, it is not surprising that debates about
MSAs track the arguments in the retirement context about the relative
merits of the defined benefit and defined contribution formats. Opponents
of MSAs argue that such accounts will be utilized by relatively healthy
persons who feel that they can, via the MSA, handle their routine medical
issues alone. Thus, in a world of MSAs, conventional, full-service medical
insurance will be subject to an adverse selection process: Less healthy
persons will pursue conventional insurance to pool risk with others. The
premiums for such insurance will rise as the insurance pool reflects the
137. This is true whether medical insurance takes the form of traditional indemnity insurance
or HMO and other managed care arrangements. That HMOs and similar managed care devices
spread risk, like classic indemnity insurance, has proved to be a critical factor in the Supreme
Court's evolving jurisprudence of ERISA preemption. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Against a Federal
Patients'Bill of Rights, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 443,450-51 (2003).
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poorer health of the remaining participants in the pool. A vicious cycle will
ensue as relatively healthy persons respond to higher premiums by shifting
to the MSA format that, in turn, further isolates those less healthy in the
conventional insurance system and increases the costs to those who remain
in that system.
138
The critique advanced by MSA opponents and their defense of
conventional medical insurance is analogous to the justification of the
defined benefit plan as a risk-pooling device and its alleged superiority to
the defined contribution alternative. Just as individual accounts shift the
financing of retirement from a common pool to the employee himself, the
MSA privatizes the financing of routine medical care. Just as the defined
benefit plan is a superior device for reducing longevity risk because it pools
a broad cross section of the workforce, conventional medical insurance
pools risk by covering a broad swath of the workforce, rather than a self-
selected group that is sensitive to its health needs and is thus likely less
healthy than a random cross section of workers.
On the other hand, MSA proponents, emulating the arguments of
defined contribution advocates, tout the personal autonomy of MSA
holders, the price sensitivity engendered by MSAs, and the more efficient
consumption of medical services said to result from such autonomy and
sensitivity.
At one level, the opponents of the MSA have, so far, won this debate.
Relatively few MSAs have been established, nowhere near the number
triggering the statutory cap. 139 Moreover, it is unlikely that many new
MSAs will be established in the future. 140 However, at another level, as we
shall see, the introduction of the MSA model has had greater influence than
the numbers would indicate, both by forcing many insurers to develop
comparable individual account devices in the form of health reimbursement
arrangements (HRAs) and by presaging Congress's recent authorization of
138. See PARK & LAV, supra note 136, at 7 (discussing "spiraling premium costs due to
adverse selection" caused by MSAs). Professor Roin raises the possibility that fundamental tax
reform in the form of a value-added tax could trigger a similar process for group health insurance
in general as healthy persons opt for cash wages rather than insurance coverage. See Julie Roin,
The Consequences of Undoing the Federal Income Tax, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 319, 326 (2003) ("A
vicious cycle may ensue that in the end virtually eliminates the insurance function of group health
insurance .... "). Similar observations are often made about proposals to expand health accounts
along the MSA model. See, e.g., ROBERT GREENSTEIN & EDWIN PARK, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POLICY PRIORITIES, HEALTH TAX PROVISION BEING PUSHED IN MEDICARE CONFERENCE POSES
THREATS BOTH TO LONG-TERM FISCAL POLICY AND TO THE EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH
INSURANCE SYSTEM 3 (2003), available at http://www.cbpp.org/10-27-03health.pdf.
139. See Sullivan, supra note 136 (reporting that "[t]here are fewer than 100,000 Archer
MSAs now in existence" out of a total of 750,000 authorized).
140. After December 31, 2005, new MSAs may only be established by employees of "MSA-
participating employer[s]." I.R.C. § 220(i) (West Supp. 2004). Moreover, as discussed infra,
health savings accounts can be established without many of the limitations applicable to MSAs.
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health savings accounts (HSAs). 14' HRAs and HSAs have firmly planted
the defined contribution paradigm in the health care arena.
E. Section 529, Educational Savings Accounts, and Roth IRAs
At roughly the same time Congress added the MSA to the Code, it also
added § 529 to the federal tax law. The background of § 529 is particularly
revealing, as the state-sponsored prepaid tuition programs that gave rise to
it were originally structured as defined benefit arrangements. That § 529
plans have evolved into predominantly defined contribution devices
testifies to both the strength of the defined contribution paradigm and to the
role of the financial services industry in promoting that paradigm.
Many states, grappling with the fact that even public colleges and
universities have become expensive for large segments of their populations,
have established prepaid tuition programs. Under these programs, a
purchaser (such as a parent or grandparent) pays a sum of money as prepaid
tuition for a prospective college student (such as a child or grandchild). In
return for that prepaid tuition payment, the program guarantees the
student's tuition at one of the state's institutions of higher education when
the student reaches college age. Thus, the risk of future tuition increases is
shifted to the state's program, which plans, through superior investment
performance and actuarial funding techniques, to use the prepaid tuition
funds entrusted to it to cover future tuition increases. 142 These prepaid
tuition programs are a defined-benefit-style device, pooling resources (the
prepaid tuition payments from families concerned about increasing
education costs), shifting the risk associated with such costs to the program,
and guaranteeing an output in the form of in-state tuition (whatever that
might be when a child is ready for higher education).
After the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Michigan prepaid
tuition program is exempt from the federal corporate tax, 143 Congress in
§ 529 not only confirmed the tax-exempt status of prepaid tuition
institutions but expanded the compass of such institutions, converting what
had been a defined-benefit-type guarantee of future tuition into a defined
141. See infra Sections III.H-I.
142. It has not turned out that way. See, e.g., Christopher Swope, Catch-22 for College
Savings, GOVERNING, March 2003, at 40, 40 ("[T]he combination of skyrocketing tuition rates
and a swooning stock market are forcing states to raise their prices and rethink their promises.");
see also Peter Schmidt, Prepaid-Tuition Plans Feel the Pinch, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 12,
2003, at A 19 ("What has left many state prepaid-tuition plans financially vulnerable is their basic
structure."); Robert Tomsho, Prepaid College-Tuition Plans Are Falling Short, WALL ST. J., Dec.
16, 2002, at BI ("[M]any prepaid plans are projecting actuarial deficits for the first time.").
143. Michigan v. United States, 40 F.3d 817 (6th Cir. 1994). See generally Jeffrey S.
Lehman, Social Irresponsibility, Actuarial Assumptions, and Wealth Redistribution: Lessons
About Public Policy from a Prepaid Tuition Program, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1035 (1990).
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contribution arrangement. Specifically, § 529 created a new statutory
category, the "qualified tuition program,"' 144 and declared such programs to
be federally tax exempt.
145
Under § 529, a qualified tuition program can come in either of two
forms. Such a program can permit the "purchase [of] tuition credits or
certificates on behalf of a designated beneficiary which entitle the
beneficiary to the waiver or payment of qualified higher education expenses
of the beneficiary. 146 In this incarnation, the § 529 program takes a defined
benefit configuration in which the program, in return for a current payment,
grants a future output as an in-kind "credit" or "certificate," e.g., one year
of tuition at any of State X's state-sponsored colleges in 2010.
A qualified tuition program may also take the form of "an account
which is established for the purpose of meeting the qualified higher
education expenses of the designated beneficiary of the account." 1 47 In this
version, the § 529 program uses the defined contribution format: An
individual account is established for a particular beneficiary to pay his
higher education expenses. Here, the qualified tuition program does not
promise a guaranteed future output, e.g., one year of tuition in 2010, but
rather generates an account balance available for educational expenses.
Thus, risk (both investment risk and the possibility of escalating tuition
costs) remains with the prospective student and his family, as does reward
if, for example, funds in the § 529 account grow at a faster pace than future
tuition increases.
As originally passed by Congress in 1996,148 benefits under a qualified
tuition program, whether in-kind tuition or actual cash for educational
expenses, were taxable to the beneficiary. In 2001, Congress, refining
§ 529, excused from all federal income tax both the in-kind benefits of a
qualified tuition program and cash payments from § 529 accounts to the
extent of qualified higher education costs. Hence, today, neither the college
student nor her parent pays any federal income tax upon the child's receipt
of credits for the tuition prepaid for her or upon the use of cash in a § 529
account to defray her qualified education expenses.
On the face of the statute, the financial services industry has no
particular role under § 529. The reality has been otherwise; indeed, § 529
has been a boon to the financial services industry, providing that industry
144. The original name was "qualified state tuition program."
145. A qualified tuition program may nevertheless trigger the tax on unrelated business
income. I.R.C. § 529(a) (2000).
146. Id. § 529(b)(1)(A)(i).
147. Id. § 529(b)(1)(A)(ii).
148. For a description and critique of § 529 as originally enacted, see Eric A. Lustig,
Taxation of Prepaid Tuition Plans and the 1997 Tax Provisions-Middle Class Panacea or
Placebo? Continuing Problems and Variations on a Theme, 31 AKRON L. REV. 229 (1997).
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with another tax-favored account to promote. 149 States have essentially
subcontracted their qualified tuition programs to particular firms that have
aggressively marketed § 529 in its defined contribution form, often on a
nationwide basis.
Merrill Lynch, for example, manages Maine's § 529 program. 150 A
Merrill Lynch customer in California, who has no interest in a defined-
benefit-style arrangement guaranteeing future tuition at Maine's public
colleges, can open a § 529 account with his local Merrill Lynch office.
Maine's sponsorship of the account is of no import to the Merrill Lynch
customer,1 51 who is simply offered the program as an opportunity to save
for college through a tax-favored account. From the customer's perspective,
Maine's involvement is nominal; it is Merrill Lynch that offers him an
opportunity to open a tax-favored account for the accumulation of college
funding.
5 2
This defined contribution product flows incrementally from the
experience of this customer who, via 401(k) participation or IRA
participation or both, has come to see tax-favored individual accounts as a
standard way of saving and investing for the future. From this perspective,
the § 529 account is a natural extension of his familiarity with retirement
savings in similar accounts.
In short, § 529 has come full circle from the original conception of
prepaid state tuition programs that, in defined benefit fashion, pooled funds
from state residents; shifted to the state instrumentality both investment risk
and the risk of future tuition increases; and guaranteed a specified,
projected output in the form of eventual tuition coverage. Today, the typical
149. See Swope, supra note 142, at 40 ("[P]rivate money-management firms that run the state
plans are marketing them aggressively."); see also William Baldwin, Section 529 Crime Wave,
FORBES, Dec. 8, 2003, at 24, 24 ("Section 529 lets states team up with fund outfits to offer college
savings plans."); John Kimelman, Fund Scandal Puts College Saving Plans on Alert, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 23, 2003, § 3 (Money & Business), at 6 ("Many fund companies, including Fidelity
Investments, the Vanguard Group and Franklin Templeton Investments, have formed partnerships
with state governments to offer 529 plans."); Lynn O'Shaughnessy, Avoiding Fee Pitfalls as
College Savings Climb, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2003, § 3 (Money & Business), at 8 ("More states
have been embracing broker-sold savings plans, partly because of pressure from the financial
industry, which wants to participate more in this growing area.").
150. My discussion in the text of Merrill Lynch is illustrative. I could as easily have
discussed another state's program managed by a comparable firm. For example, Franklin
Templeton manages the New Jersey § 529 program. See Cecily Patterson, Special Advertising
Section, Tuition Planning, FORBES, June 23, 2003.
151. With the qualification that, as noted infra, some states provide deductions against their
income taxes for contributions to their own respective § 529 programs.
152. See, e.g., Fin. Auth. of Me., FAME Education-NextGen, http://www.famemaine.com/
html/education/nextgen.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2004) (noting management of state program by
Merrill Lynch). Another increasingly common format has been the intermediate firm that arranges
for the rebate to § 529 accounts of a portion of consumer purchases. See, e.g., Baby Mint,
http://www.babymint.com (last visted Nov. 23, 2004); Upromise, http://www.upromise.com (last
visited Nov. 23, 2004).
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§ 529 account, as promoted by the financial services industry, is an
individual account for higher education outlays. Given the aggressiveness
with which the industry has promoted these individual account
arrangements, it is not surprising that, just as the assets held by defined
contribution retirement plans have outstripped those of defined benefit
pensions, the amounts invested in defined-contribution-style § 529 accounts
now exceed the amounts held by defined-benefit-style prepaid tuition
plans. 153
Besides this shift to the defined contribution format, two other aspects
of § 529 are noteworthy. First, the tax treatment today incorporated in § 529
(no deduction on contribution, investment earnings grow tax free, no
income taxation on distribution) finds increasing favor with Congress and
the President in contradistinction to the traditional tax treatment of qualified
plans and conventional IRAs (deductible contributions, investment earnings
grow tax free, income taxation on distribution). 154 From the taxpayer's
perspective, the alternative regime, assuming stable tax rates, is equivalent
economically to the traditional tax pattern. 155 However, the political appeal
of the newer formula is undeniable, because that formula, under existing
budgetary accounting rules, moves perceived revenue losses from the
present, because there is no current deduction on contribution, to the future
when funds are paid out tax free.
A second noteworthy feature of § 529 is the absence of income-based
limits on participation. Since TRA86, if a taxpayer is covered by a qualified
plan, his ability to make deductible IRA contributions is limited (and
eventually eliminated) as his income rises. As we shall see, this type of
income-based restriction has been extended to other Code provisions
153. Swope, supra note 142, at 40; see also O'Shaughnessy, supra note 149 ("In a short time,
the state-sponsored 529 savings plan has become one of the nation's most popular ways to invest
for college. About $30 billion is now spread among more than three million accounts, and the
flood of cash is rising exponentially.").
154. Some states provide income tax deductions for contributions made to their own § 529
programs. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 12D.3(1)(a) (2004) (providing Iowa income tax deduction up to
$2000 per beneficiary for contribution to Iowa Educational Savings Plan Trust); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 7-2-32 (Michie 2001) (providing deduction for contributions to the New Mexico education trust
fund).
155. If tax rates remain stable, the participant ends up with the same after-tax amount under
either tax regime. As Professor Halperin has recently noted, the economic equivalence of the two
tax patterns has received considerable attention in comparisons of Roth and conventional IRAs.
See Daniel Halperin, A Fairer and More Effective Approach to Deferred Compensation, 103 TAX
NOTES 1187, 1187 (2004); see also PAUL BURNHAM, CBO, TAX-DEFERRED RETIREMENT
SAVINGS IN LONG-TERM REVENUE PROJECTIONS 6 (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/54xx/doc5418/05-10-RetirementSavings.pdf ("As long as tax rates remain constant over
the cycle of contributions and withdrawals, the ultimate tax benefits of Roth IRAs relative to
regular savings are exactly the same as those of deductible IRAs.").
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regulating defined contribution devices. 156 But not to § 529. Thus, § 529
accounts can be marketed to affluent families,157 a feature undoubtedly of
interest to the financial services industry.
Unlike § 529 programs, Congress constrained the educational savings
account with income-based restrictions. As originally enacted in 1997,
these accounts bore the oxymoronic label "educational IRAs."158 As a
political matter, that label reflected the same strategy as ERTA's use of the
IRA to create a universal savings vehicle: An arguably radical innovation
instead appeared to be incremental, the modest extension of the IRA status
quo. 159
As originally passed by Congress in 1997, the educational IRA was
indeed modest in scope. In addition to the income-based limitations
Congress imposed on contributions to such accounts, Congress also initially
capped contributions to educational IRAs at $500 per year and made those
contributions nondeductible. Like the funds placed in § 529 plans, the funds
given to educational IRAs in their initial incarnation could be used only for
higher education expenses. To the extent so used, withdrawals from
educational IRAs were (and are) tax free, thus subjecting such devices to
the alternative tax pattern: nondeductible contributions, tax-free income,
and tax-free withdrawals.
In 2001, the educational IRA was retooled in important respects. 160 The
$500 annual contribution limit was raised to $2000. The income-based
limitations on contributions were liberalized.1 61 Most importantly, Congress
permitted funds in educational IRAs to be used for "qualified elementary
and secondary education expenses," which include costs connected with
"public, private, or religious" schooling. 62 Finally, in 2002, these accounts
were given a more apt moniker, "Coverdell education savings accounts," in
memory of a prime advocate of these devices. 
163
156. See infra notes 165-166 and accompanying text (discussing Roth IRAs and educational
accounts).
157. SUSAN DYNARSKI, TAX POLICY AND EDUCATION POLICY: COLLISION OR
COORDINATION? A CASE STUDY OF THE 529 AND COVERDELL SAVINGS VEHICLES 16 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10,357, 2004) ("[S]ince the 529 has no eligibility
requirements, it provides the first opportunity for tax-advantaged saving for those families
ineligible for the IRA or [the Coverdell education saving account] due to their incomes or their
access to a pension program at work.").
158. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 213(a), 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. (111
Stat.) 788, 813 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 530 (2000)).
159. See supra notes 116-121 and accompanying text.
160. See EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §§ 401, 402(a)(4), 2001 U.S.C.C.A.N. (115 Stat.)
38, 57-61 (amending I.R.C. § 530 (2000)).
161. See DYNARSKI, supra note 157, at 10-11 (contrasting the income and contribution limits
applicable to the Coverdell education savings account with the more liberal rules for § 529 plans).
162. See I.R.C. § 530(b)(4)(A)(1) (2000).
163. I.R.C. § 530 (West 2002). The accounts are named for the late Senator Paul Coverdell.
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It remains to be seen whether education savings accounts will become
as ubiquitous as IRA and 401(k) plans. 164 What cannot be gainsaid is that,
between § 529 plans and educational savings accounts, Congress has firmly
implanted tax-favored individual accounts for education into federal tax and
social policy.
The other defined contribution device introduced by Congress in 1997
was the Roth IRA. The critical difference between the Roth IRA and the
traditional IRA that it adapts is the sequence of taxation. Instead of the tax
pattern of a conventional IRA (deduction on contribution, tax-free earnings,
taxation on distribution), a Roth IRA uses the alternative sequence (no
deduction on contribution, tax-free income during the accumulation phase,
tax-free distribution). While that alternative tax sequence has plausible
justifications, undoubtedly the driving force behind Congress's decision to
embrace that sequence for the Roth IRA (as well as for § 529 and education
savings accounts) is the budgetary accounting convention 165 that allocates
revenue losses to the future when amounts will be withdrawn tax free from
these accounts.166 Hence, via the Roth IRA, Congress added one more
device to the defined contribution paradigm on politically attractive terms:
The budgetary costs of the Roth alternative will fall on future Congresses.
F. Cash Balance, New Comparability, and Age- Weighted Plans
While Congress was, during the 1990s, reinforcing and expanding the
defined contribution paradigm by establishing these new statutory devices,
other developments were confirming and accelerating the emergence of that
paradigm. To the general public, the best known of these developments was
the cash balance pension plan, a defined benefit arrangement designed to
look like an individual account plan. 67 Under a cash balance plan, the
employer guarantees a benefit that emulates a 401(k) or other individual
account balance. The employer sponsoring a cash balance pension thus
assumes funding and investment risk by guaranteeing a specified output,
which guaranteed output mimics the lump sum account balance that
predominates in a defined contribution society.
164. For a discussion and critique of the Coverdell educational savings account, see George
Salimbas, Educational Opportunities for Taxpayers, 18 AKRON TAX J. 1. 29-32 (2003).
165. See Elizabeth Garrett, Accounting for the Federal Budget and Its Reform, 41 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 187, 190 (2004) ("Tax provisions can be drafted so that most of the revenue loss occurs
in the future, outside the budget window of one, five or ten years .... An example of a back-
loaded tax provision is the Roth IRA ... ).
166. Indeed, the pattern of after-tax contributions, tax-free earnings, and tax-free distribution
has proved so appealing to Congress that in 2001 it extended the option of such treatment to both
401(k) and 403(b) plans. See I.R.C. § 402A (establishing "qualified Roth contribution
program[s]").
167. See Zelinsky, supra note 4, at 687.
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As we have seen, the traditional defined benefit plan promises a
deferred annuity at retirement age and typically determines the amount of
that annuity based upon the participant's salary and service history with the
sponsoring employer. This tends to favor older, long-term workers who
accumulate substantial employment history with the sponsoring employer.
In contrast, a cash balance plan guarantees a benefit but specifies that
benefit in terms of a theoretical account balance. This theoretical account
balance is nominally credited with a portion of the participant's salary, thus
mimicking the employer contributions under a true defined contribution
arrangement. This theoretical account balance is also credited with a
notional interest factor, again to look like an individual account
arrangement. However, in the cash balance context, no separate account for
the participant actually exists. Rather, the defined benefit trustee holds a
common pool of funds financing the cumulative total of all participants'
theoretical account balances.
Suppose, for example, that a cash balance pension credits each
participant's notional account with ten percent of her salary and augments
each such account with a nominal interest factor of five percent. Suppose
further that a hypothetical cash balance participant earns a salary of $50,000
in the current year. Under this cash balance plan, the participant's
theoretical account is credited with $5000 as a pay credit and with a
notional interest credit of $250. Thus, she has a fixed claim against the plan
for a lump sum of $5250.168
If, to continue the example, the trustee garners a seven percent return
on the plan's assets, the cash balance participant is not entitled to any more
than $5250, because the plan is a defined benefit arrangement. Superior
investment performance inures to the sponsoring employer, not to the
participating employee, who receives a guaranteed, defined benefit in the
form of an ersatz account balance. Conversely, if the trustee earns only a
three percent return on the plan's assets, the participant is not harmed,
because she is assured of $5250, based on notional interest earnings of
$250. Any shortfall in actual investment earnings is the employer's liability
because the employer has promised a benefit based on a five percent return.
On the other hand, if this were a true defined contribution plan, the
employer, once it conveyed the $5000 to a genuine separate account for the
employee, would have no further obligation. The participant would be
entitled to whatever amount the account rose or fell to without any
guarantee from the employer or the plan.
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If the participant terminates her employment with the firm sponsoring
this cash balance plan, she usually receives (in defined contribution style)
an immediate lump sum distribution of her notional account balance rather
than the deferred annuity of the traditional defined benefit arrangement. 1
69
In short, the cash balance plan is a defined benefit pension: The plan
and the employer guarantee a benefit; the risk and reward of investment
performance accrue to the plan and the employer, not to the employee; and
funds are invested by the plan trustee as a common pool from which
benefits are paid. However, the benefit of a cash balance plan is defined and
typically paid as an individual-account-style lump sum. This mixture of
features shifts longevity risk to the employee (because the employee
receives her distribution as a lump sum) while the employer incurs the
funding and investment risk of a defined benefit arrangement (because the
employer promises a benefit, albeit one formulated as an ersatz account
balance rather than a traditional deferred annuity). Given this mix, it is not
surprising that cash balance pensions are often denoted "hybrid" plans. 1
70
Much controversy has surrounded cash balance plans. 171 For purposes
of this Article, one aspect of that controversy is revealing: employers'
justifications for switching their defined benefit plans to the cash balance
format.
Those firms that have shifted their defined benefit plans from the
traditional format to the cash balance motif justify that shift via the norms
of the defined contribution paradigm: Workers, particularly younger
workers, today neither appreciate nor understand traditional defined benefit
plans with their deferred annuity payments and benefit formulas based on
salary and work history.1 72 Few expect to remain with an employer long
enough to accrue significant benefits under the back-loaded, service-based
formulas of traditional defined benefit plans.173 To adapt to the expectations
of a younger, more mobile workforce, expectations molded by 401(k) plans
and similar individual account devices, the defined benefit pension must
conform to those expectations.
Hence, the cash balance plan formulates its benefits in terms of
theoretical account balances and pays immediate distributions upon the
169. Again, subject to vesting rules. See PURCELL, supra note 8, at 6 ("Virtually all cash
balance plans offer a lump-sum distribution option to departing employees who are vested in their
benefits.").
170. See, e.g., id.; Nicholas G. Apostolou et al., Illusionary Pension Fund Returns, 99 TAX
NOTES 565, 567 (2003).
171. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, What if a Pension Shift Hit Lawmakers, Too?, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, § 3 (Money & Business), at 1.
172. For one commentator who agrees, see Jane Bryant Quinn, Oh, No-More Pension Blues,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 20, 2003, at 35, 35 ("[Traditional] pensions are going the way of the dodo. They
bore young workers and multiply the cost of maintaining an aging work force.").
173. PURCELL, supra note 8, at Summary.
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employee's termination of employment because these are the expectations
workers have developed from their experiences with 401 (k) plans and other
individual account arrangements. The hybrid features of a cash balance plan
represent the best of both worlds, as those features achieve the superior
investment performance of a commonly managed pool and shift investment
risk to the employer. At the same time, the cash balance plan defines and
pays benefits in a fashion that mimics the individual account format that has
become the norm for American workers.
Even if this is not the entire story, 174 this defense of cash balance plans
is instructive in that it reveals how far we have traveled down the defined
contribution road. A generation ago, it would have been anomalous to
suggest that defined benefit plans must jettison some of their traditional
features (i.e., deferred annuity payments based on salary and service
formulas) to emulate defined contribution arrangements. Today, it is a
compelling, if not totally complete, explanation for the popularity of cash
balance plans that, to survive in the defined contribution culture, defined
benefit plans must be restyled to emulate individual account plans.
Equally instructive in confirming the emergence of the defined
contribution culture are the hybrid plans that have earned the monikers "age
weighted" and "new comparability." 175 While cash balance pensions are
174. I believe it is not. Traditional pensions are more expensive to fund for older employees
because these employees are closer to retirement, leaving fewer years for the pension's trust funds
to earn investment returns. Older employees also tend to be more highly paid than their younger
coworkers. Consequently, shifting to the cash balance format reduces the sponsoring employer's
costs as to older employees by eliminating the expensive pension benefits these employees would
earn under the traditional, back-loaded defined benefit format. See Zelinsky, supra note 4, at 704-
15. Employers shifting to the cash balance format may also (with good reason) be concerned that
they will attract older workers if such employers retain their traditional defined benefit pensions.
As the Baby Boom cohort enters its "empty nester" phase, employers maintaining traditional
annuity-paying defined benefit plans may fear that those plans will attract older, more expensive
participants, now free to relocate, because their child-rearing responsibilities are over. Hence the
shift to the cash balance motif to avoid attracting older Baby Boomers, now interested in
traditional, annuity-paying pensions.
Moreover, some sponsors of well-funded traditional defined benefit plans shift to the cash
balance format (rather than establish true defined contribution plans) to avoid the excise tax on
plan reversions under § 4980. See id. at 713. IBM has, in recent litigation, been commendably
candid on this score. Cooper v. IBM Pers. Pension Plan, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1022 (S.D. I11.
2003) ("According to IBM, [moving to a defined contribution plan] was impractical as the Plan
surplus could not have been 'tax effectively' withdrawn ..").
Finally, an important factor is the perception that sponsors of cash balance pensions can
obtain more favorable accounting treatment of plan-based liabilities than can the sponsors of
traditional, annuity-based defined benefit plans. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, Changes
Discussed in Accounting for Some Pension Fund Obligations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2003, at Cl.
175. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Is Cross-Testing a Mistake? Cash Balance Plans. New
Comparability Formulas, and the Incoherence of the Nondiscrimination Norm, 49 BUFF. L. REv.
575, 587, 598 (2001) [hereinafter Zelinksy, Is Cross-Testing a Mistake?] (defining new
comparability and age-weighted plans); see also Edward A. Zelinsky, Cross-Testing,
Nondiscrimination, and New Comparability: A Rejoinder to Mr. Orszag and Professor Stein, 49
BUFF. L. REv. 675 (2001) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Rejoinder].
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defined benefit plans that mimic individual account arrangements, age-
weighted and new comparability plans are individual account plans that
mimic defined benefit pensions. In particular, under an age-weighted or
new comparability plan, the employer allocates contributions among
employees, not in the typical way as a percentage of each employee's
salary, but rather in a fashion that emulates the employer's contributions as
if the plan were a defined benefit device. Such an allocation formula skews
contributions toward older, higher-paid employees because, in the defined
benefit context, more must be contributed to fund projected benefits that are
based on higher salaries and are scheduled to begin sooner. Because older
employees are closer to retirement, there is less time for the pension's trust
fund to accumulate investment earnings before such employees retire.
Moreover, older employees are typically higher paid than their younger
colleagues and are thus entitled to higher salary-based defined benefits.
Accordingly, more must be funded by the employer to finance the benefits
starting upon such employees' retirements.
This is another manifestation of the back-loading phenomenon
discussed earlier: 176 Under defined benefit plans, late-career accruals tend to
be particularly valuable for employees (and commensurately expensive for
employers) both because older employees are generally better paid than
their younger coworkers and because older workers are closer to retirement,
when benefits must be paid.
These observations prompt the inquiry, If new comparability and age-
weighted plans are defined contribution arrangements under which the
employer's contributions are allocated among employees like a defined
benefit pension, why don't employers instead establish defined benefit
plans? The answer harkens back to the burdens ERISA imposed on defined
benefit arrangements, in particular, the minimum funding requirements of
§ 412 and PBGC premiums.
1 77
Those who decide about plan design are generally older and better-paid
employees, typically the owners or managers of the firm. New
comparability and age-weighted formulas give these decisionmakers the
advantages of defined benefit funding patterns weighted in their favor while
sparing the firm the inflexibility and the costs of the minimum funding rules
and PBGC premiums. In addition, new comparability and age-weighted
plans, because they are defined contribution devices, can permit employees
to self-direct their own investments. This abates trustee liability for such
investing while granting to the employees something they may view as
176. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
177. Smaller professional plans are not covered by the PBGC. See ERISA § 4021(b)(13), 29
U.S.C. § 1321(b)(13) (2000).
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valuable: the right to direct the allocation of their own funds, with the
resulting sense of ownership and control.
In short, the new comparability and age-weighted designs reflect the
regulatory burdens placed on defined benefit plans and constitute yet other
defined contribution alternatives for firms that, a generation ago, would
have used defined benefit pensions to skew contributions toward their
older, better-paid employees. These designs also reflect the extent to which
the defined contribution paradigm and the individual account that are the
hallmarks of the paradigm have become central to contemporary
understanding and implementation of retirement savings.
G. Public Employee Pensions and § 457 Plans
The discussion so far has documented the extent to which the
traditional defined benefit plan has stagnated in the private-sector economy,
while individual account arrangements have, in their various incarnations,
become predominant in the private retirement system and increasingly
common for educational savings and medical outlays. Reflecting further the
shift toward the defined contribution paradigm is states' and municipalities'
embrace of that paradigm for public employee pensions. As recently as five
years ago, the movement to convert public employee pensions to the
individual account format was nascent. It has now accelerated to the point
where defined contribution plans often serve as replacements for or as
alternatives to many states' and municipalities' traditional defined benefit
pensions. 178 Other states are contemplating a transition to the defined
contribution format.1
79
This change has a variety of causes: the American culture of private
ownership, the influence of the financial services industry and conservative
ideological groups, the concern that defined benefit plans tempt politicians
to reap the political advantages of promising benefits while leaving the
problem of funding to their successors,1 80 and the self-reinforcing
178. See Phyllis Feinberg, Brighter Skies in Forecast for Florida's 401(a) Plan, PENSIONS &
INVESTMENTS, May 3, 2004, at 4; Phyllis Feinberg, Other States Might Follow Oregon's DC
Trail, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Apr. 5, 2004, at 19; Profiles of the Top Public Defined
Contribution Plans, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Mar. 31, 2003, at 16; see also GAO, supra note
32, at 20 (discussing Florida's recent adoption of an optional individual account plan for its
employees).
179. See, e.g., Dave Kovaleski, State Eyes DC Plan That Is Mandatory for New Workers,
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Mar. 17, 2003, at 4 (discussing Massachusetts). However, one
commentator believes that the shift to public defined contribution plans has peaked. Anya Sostek,
Pension Pendulum, GOVERNING, Mar. 2004, at 28.
180. A concern not without a basis in fact. See, e.g., John E. Petersen, In an Era of
Uncertainty, States and Localities Are Looking to Some Unusual Options, GOVERNING, June '
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expectations of workers and taxpayers molded by the norms of the defined
contribution culture. Taxpayers who experience retirement savings as
401(k) plans are likely to agree that public employees should provide for
their retirements in similar fashion. For now, the important point is that this
last bastion of the defined benefit plan, state and municipal employee
pensions, is under assault.
Even state and local governments that maintain traditional defined
benefit pensions for their employees often provide a supplementary defined
contribution program, known as a § 457 plan. Congress adopted I.R.C.
§ 457 in response to the perception that tax-exempt employers can offer
their employees unique tax benefits via nonqualified deferred
compensation.
When an individual employed by a taxable employer defers
compensation outside of a qualified plan, the employer's deduction for
that compensation is delayed until the employee ultimately reports the
deferred compensation as income. 81 Moreover, if, prior to distribution to
the employee, the deferred compensation is retained and invested by the
taxable employer, the annual earnings generated by that compensation are
themselves taxable because these earnings are attributable to a taxable
person, the employer. The deferred compensation bargain between a
taxable employer and its employee will reflect the employer's tax burden
stemming from that deferral of compensation.
In contrast, when an individual employed by a tax-exempt entity (such
as a state or local government) defers otherwise taxable compensation,
there is no tax cost to the employer in terms of a delayed deduction for the
deferred compensation because the exempt employer pays no tax anyway
and is thus indifferent as to when the employee recognizes income.
Similarly, if an exempt employer retains deferred income for ultimate
distribution to the employee, the earnings of those deferred amounts are
free of tax because the employer itself is free of tax. Consequently, the
concern animating § 457 is that tax-exempt employers and their employees
can negotiate favorable deferred compensation arrangements at the expense
of the federal fisc because there is no tax cost to exempt employers to
participating in such arrangements. 
182
2004, at 54, 56 (claiming that states and localities are "skipping or reducing contributions" to their
pension plans); Janice Revell, The $366 Billion Outrage, FORTUNE, May 31, 2004, at 130.
181. I.R.C. § 83(h) (2000) (delaying the employer deduction until "the taxable year in which
such amount is included in the gross income" of the employee).
182. For a recent colloquy between two prominent members of the tax community debating
the logic of § 457, see Peter L. Faber, It's Time To Repeal Section 457, 100 TAX NOTES 416
(2003); Daniel Halperin, Section 457 Should Be Replaced by a Special Tax on Investment Income,
100 TAX NOTES 730 (2003); Peter L. Faber, Arguments Against Section 457 Repeal Don't Stand
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Consequently, § 457 was adopted to constrain the ability of tax-exempt
employers and their employees to engage in deferred compensation
arrangements. Section 457 is similar to § 401(k) and § 403(b); like those
provisions, § 457 both permits and limits employees' ability to defer
compensation and thereby postpone income taxation until actual receipt of
that deferred compensation. Under § 457, employees of tax-exempt
employers1 83 can defer compensation subject to an annual ceiling in 2004 of
$13,000.184 The amounts deferred pursuant to § 457, including earnings, are
subsequently taxable to the participant or his beneficiary upon eventual
distribution.' 85
Just as § 401(k) triggered an explosive growth in profit-sharing plans
with cash-or-deferred features, § 457 has catalyzed the establishment of
deferred compensation programs. Over forty billion dollars are now held by
§ 457 plans. 186 Particularly noteworthy has been Congress's recent decision
to incorporate governmental § 457 plans into the network of rules
governing rollovers, a decision that firmly plants § 457 within the statutory
structure of the defined contribution paradigm.
1 87
H. Health Reimbursement Arrangements
Among recent developments, the "health reimbursement arrangement"
(HRA) represents the insurance industry's response to the defined
contribution paradigm. As approved by the IRS in 2002,188 the HRA is an
individual account for health care controlled by the covered employee.
Up, 100 TAx NOTES 969 (2003); and Daniel Halperin, Section 457 Repeal Debate Continues, 100
TAX NOTES 1455 (2003).
183. Originally, § 457 applied only to employees of state and local governments. I.R.C. § 457
(1982). Today, it applies to such public employees and all employees of tax-exempt entities.
I.R.C. § 457(e)(1) (2000).
184. I.R.C. § 457(e)(15)(A) (West 2002). Under no circumstances can the employee defer
more than the amount of his income. The $13,000 annual limit is scheduled to increase to $14,000
in 2005 and $15,000 in 2006. Id. Thereafter, the yearly limit will be increased by a cost-of-living
adjustment. The employee may also make additional catch-up deferrals at the end of his career.
I.R.C. § 457(e)(18) (West Supp. 2004).
185. I.R.C. § 457(a) (2000). In the case of nongovernmental, nonprofit employers, amounts
are also taxable when "made available to the participant" or to the participant's beneficiary. Id.
186. Arleen Jacobius, 457 Plans Win Top Spot in Popularity with Government, PENSIONS &
INVESTMENTS, Mar. 31, 2003, at 14.
187. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 402(c)(8)(B)(v) (West Supp. 2004) (permitting rollover from
governmental § 457 plan into IRA).
188. I.R.S. Notice 2002-45, 2002-28 I.R.B. 93; Rev. Rul. 2002-41, 2002-28 I.R.B. 75. In
Revenue Ruling 2003-43, 2003-21 I.R.B. 935, the IRS condoned HRAs using debit and credit
cards and other forms of electronic payment. For a comprehensive discussion of these rulings and
the Code sections that they implement, see Dianne Bennett, Health Reimbursement
Arrangements: Boon or Bane for Employers?, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 25, § 2.01, at 2-1, § 2.02. See also
Zelinsky, supra note 137, at 465-68.
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After the employee (or her dependent) incurs a health care outlay, the HRA
defrays that cost. Typically, the employee covered by an HRA issues the
equivalent of a check to the medical service provider, pays the provider
with a special credit card, or pays the provider from her own funds, then
applies for HRA reimbursement. In any event, the employer is the ultimate
source of payment, which payment depletes the employee's balance for
future medical expenses. The employer can administer the HRA itself or
can hire an insurer or other agency to implement the HRA for it. Unlike the
MSA, the HRA does not entail segregated, funded investments that the
employee controls for herself.
An employer that completely self-funds medical coverage for its
employees can provide all such coverage through HRAs. 189 More typical
(so far, at least) are HRAs that cover employees' routine health costs up to
an amount specified by the employer.' 90 Above that base level,
conventional insurance is triggered when the HRA is exhausted.' 9' The
insurance industry is now actively promoting packages along these lines-
the HRA for basic, routine medical costs coupled with insurance for larger
health outlays.' 
92
When linked to conventional insurance coverage, the HRA adapts the
MSA model just as the MSA adapted the IRA model. Indeed, when coupled
with conventional insurance, the resemblance of the HRA to the MSA
(combined with high-deductible insurance) is striking. It is most reasonable
to view the HRA as the insurance industry's cooptation of the MSA model,
a recognition that, in a defined contribution society, the insurance industry
must offer an individual account product.
189. See, e.g., Zina Moukheiber, Give Them a Stake, FORBES, May 13, 2002, at 171, 171-72
(discussing Definity Health, an administrator of HRAs for self-funded employers).
190. Note that an HRA is not an FSA under which the employee chooses between taxable
compensation and nontaxable fringe benefits. Rather, under an HRA, the employer specifies the
level of coverage for all participating employees, who have no right to elect another form of
benefit or cash compensation instead. See Brian L. Shiker & Emily C. Vitan, Defined
Contribution Health Plans: A Tool To Help Control Rising Health Care Costs, J. PENSION PLAN.
& COMPLIANCE, Spring 2003, at 53, 57.
191. Under some HRA arrangements, the employee, after exhausting her account, must
herself pay some additional medical expenses before triggering insurance coverage. See, e.g., Beth
Kobliner, A New Health Plan Works, at Least for the Healthy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2003, § 3
(Money & Business), at 8 (describing the HRA of CompuCom Systems).
192. See, e.g., Health Insurance: Defined Contribution Product for Employers Announced by
Wisconsin Blue Cross Plan, BNA PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY, Apr. 11, 2002; Elizabeth White,
Defined Contribution Health Plans Emerge as Employers Face Double-Digit Cost Hikes, BNA
PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY, Feb. 25, 2002 ("[A]n increasing number of big-name health insurers
are rolling out defined contribution products.").
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I. Health Savings Accounts
If the MSA represents a defined contribution toehold in the financing of
health care, the "health savings account" (HSA) authorized by Congress in
2003193 institutionalizes the individual account approach to medicine.
Unlike MSAs, HSAs are neither limited to a fixed number of taxpayers nor
restricted to those employees who work for small employers. In practical
terms, the HSA, Congress' most recent embrace of the defined contribution
paradigm, further extends the MSA model just as the MSA extends the IRA
model.
Any individual who is covered by a high-deductible health plan and
who is generally not covered by any other insurance or health plan may
establish and make tax-deductible contributions to an HSA. 194 For these
purposes, a high-deductible health plan is a health plan with a minimum
annual deductible of at least $1000 for an unmarried individual ($2000 for a
family) and a maximum annual deductible of $5000 for an unmarried
individual ($10,000 for a family).' 95
If an individual establishing an HSA is the only person covered by a
high-deductible health plan, he may annually contribute and deduct for
income tax purposes the lesser of $2250 or the amount of the annual
deductible under the plan. 196 An individual who establishes an HSA and
who maintains high-deductible coverage for his family may contribute and
deduct yearly the lesser of $4500 or the annual deductible under that family
plan. 197 HSAs receive the same income tax treatment as MSAs:
Contributions (subject to these limits) are deductible for income tax
purposes; 198 earnings of HSAs grow tax free; 199 and distributions from
HSAs are tax free as long as such distributions are used for medical
expenses.2°°
It is obviously too early to know whether (as HSA proponents hope)
large employers, forbidden from utilizing MSAs in the design of their
193. I.R.C. § 223 (West Supp. 2004), added by Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1201, 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. (117 Stat.)
2066, 2469; see also I.R.S. Notice 2004-2, 2004-2 I.R.B. 269.
194. An individual may be covered by certain kinds of health plans and still maintain an
HSA, provided that he is also covered by a high-deductible plan. These permitted forms of
coverage include long-term-care insurance, accident and disability coverage, dental and vision
care plans, and workers' compensation insurance. I.R.C. § 223(c)(1)(B), (c)(3). For an application
of these rules, see Rev. Rul. 2004-45, 2004-22 I.R.B. 971.
195. I.R.C. § 223(c)(2). These limits will be adjusted for inflation. Id. § 223(g).
196. Id. § 223(b)(2)(A). These limits will be adjusted for inflation. Id. § 223(g).
197. Id. § 223(b)(2)(B). Again, these limits will be adjusted for inflation. Id. § 223(g).
198. Id. § 223(a).
199. Id. § 223(e)(1).
200. Id. § 223(f)(1).
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health care arrangements, will find attractive the combination of HSAs and
high-deductible coverage. At a minimum, the enactment of the HSA
guarantees that traditional insurers will continue to offer insurance
coordinated with HRAs as an alternative for persons who might otherwise
be tempted by the HSA model. The more robust possibility (sought by HSA
supporterS20 and feared by HSA detractors 202) is that HSAs, freed of the
limitations and restrictions applicable to MSAs, will find broad acceptance
in the medical insurance marketplace. In either event, the defined
contribution paradigm will have been ensconced in the funding of health
care.
J. Proposals
The strength of the defined contribution paradigm is further confirmed
by the many individual account proposals receiving serious attention today
from policymakers and analysts. These proposals (as well as those
possibilities beyond the bounds of current debate) demonstrate the extent to
which the individual account model defines the parameters of contemporary
public discussion of tax and social policy.
Chief among the proposals manifesting the power of the defined
contribution format is the much-discussed suggestion that the federal Social
Security program be modified to include individual accounts.2 °3 A
generation ago, such a proposal (like the cash balance plan) would have
been inconceivable. Today, proposals for such accounts bear the
imprimatur of the President of the United States, a reflection of the way in
which the norms of the defined contribution paradigm have come to set the
201. See, e.g., TOM MILLER, JOINT ECON. COMM., HOW THE TAX EXCLUSION SHAPED
TODAY'S PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET 6 (2003), available at
http://jec.senate.gov/ files/HealthTaxExclusion.pdf ("Consumer-driven health vehicles would
reacquaint individuals with the cost and quality of the choices they can manage on their own.");
Steve Forbes, Big Good in a Bad Bill, FORBES, Dec. 22, 2003, at 35 (stating that HSAs will "put
patients in charge of their own health care dollars"); Newt Gingrich, Op-Ed, Bill Sets Foundation
for Revitalizing Medicare, NEW HAVEN REG., Dec. 3, 2003, at A6 ("Health Savings Accounts are
the single most important change in health-care policy in 60 years.").
202. HSA opponents raise the same concerns as MSA opponents: that HSAs, if they become
widespread, will result in adverse selection, with relatively healthy persons using HSAs and sicker
individuals relegated to conventional insurance. Given the close similarity of the HSA and the
MSA, it is unsurprising that those who criticize these accounts raise the same arguments-and
tend to be the same people. See, e.g., GREENSTEIN & PARK, supra note 138, at 3 ("As HSA use
becomes more widespread, the health policy consequences are likely to become increasingly
serious, especially for older and sicker workers.").
203. See, e.g., AARON & SHOVEN, supra note 18; GAO, supra note 32; PRIVATIZING SOCIAL
SECURITY (Martin Feldstein ed., 1998); JAMES R. STOREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER
CODE RL30397, SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT PROPOSALS (2002); Medill,
supra note 18.
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parameters for contemporary debate.2 °4 One can no more imagine President
Nixon discussing individual accounts for Social Security than one can
imagine him discussing the Internet.
In other ways also, President Bush has been a proponent of the defined
contribution model. His budget for 2004 proposed a major expansion of
MSAs. 2 5 That proposal undoubtedly boosted the movement resulting in the
authorization of HSAs. Bush also advocates IRA-style "re-employment"
accounts.20 6 Such accounts would replace conventional unemployment
compensation and retraining programs with a lump sum controlled by the
unemployed worker. When the worker obtains reemployment, any
unexpended balance in the account would be the worker's to keep on a
taxable basis.
President Bush has also proposed a radical modification and expansion
of other defined contribution programs today embodied in the Code.207 In
addition, he has endorsed "individual development accounts," the proceeds
of which would be available for higher education expenses, first-time home
purchases, or small-business creation.208 Such individual development
accounts are now widely used by the states to encourage self-reliance and
entrepreneurial efforts among the poor.20 9
Proposals to expand the defined contribution network have been
advanced by Democrats as well. President Clinton, for example, advocated
204. See President Bush's Acceptance Speech of Sept. 3, 2004, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2004, at
P4 ("We must strengthen Social Security by allowing younger workers to save more of their taxes
in a personal account.").
205. MSAs and President Bush's proposal to expand them are described (and criticized) in
PARK & LAV, supra note 136. See also EDWIN PARK & IRIS J. LAV, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY
PRIORITIES, WHAT'S IN A NAME? HOUSE BILL WOULD CHANGE NAME BUT NOT THE
SUBSTANCE OF A PROPOSED EXPANSION OF MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS 1 (2003), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/6-26-03tax.pdf (making similar criticisms of the Health Savings Account
Availability Act, H.R. 2351, 108th Cong. (2003), as "essentially identical to the proposal to
greatly expand MSAs included in the Administration's fiscal year 2004 budget"); Sullivan, supra
note 136 (discussing the Bush proposal for "an extension and expansion of Archer MSAs").
206. See, e.g., Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Providing Job Opportunities for
America's Workers (June 17, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/
06/20030617.html; see also Steve Lohr, Debate over Exporting Jobs Raises Questions on
Policies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2004, at C I (describing the Bush proposal for "personal re-
employment accounts"); George F. Will, Once More, The Bullhorn, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 20, 2003, at
84, 84 (same).
207. For excellent descriptions of those proposals, see PATRICK J. PURCELL, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE RS21451, RETIREMENT SAVINGS ACCOUNTS: PRESIDENT'S
BUDGET PROPOSAL FOR FY2005 (2004); and David A. Pratt, Pension Reform Proposals, in NEW
YORK UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra
note 25, § 3.01, at 3-1, §§ 3.03-.07. For a critique of those proposals, see Gene Steuerle, The
Latest 'ZITCOM' and My New Tax Shelter Bank, 99 TAX NOTES 739 (2003).
208. See Robert F. Manning, Cuttings on the Conference Room Floor: Will the Grafts Take?,
100 TAX NOTES 217, 225 (2003).
209. See, e.g., Individual Development Account Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 26-2-1001 to -1005
(2002).
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the creation of "Universal Savings Accounts," with particular emphasis on
helping low-income families save for retirement. 210  Representative
Gephardt has proffered a comparable proposal to expand the defined
contribution participation of lower-income workers.211
For present purposes, it does not matter whether any of these proposals
will ultimately become law. Rather, the relevant observation is that today
these proposals define the parameters of debate. Indeed, the extent to which
the defined contribution paradigm shapes contemporary thinking about tax
and policy issues becomes clear when we consider the kinds of proposals
that fall outside those parameters and consequently command little political
support or academic interest.
Even those concerned about the decline of the private defined benefit
format are, at best, proposing minor reforms to resuscitate that format. One
can envision proposals designed to stimulate the private retirement system
back toward the traditional defined benefit pension. For example, Congress
could deny tax-advantaged treatment to individual account plans, thereby
requiring firms in search of tax savings to establish defined benefit
pensions. To articulate such a possibility is to indicate its impossibility in
the contemporary defined contribution society. No member of Congress
today would vote to deny his constituents the tax savings associated with
their IRA and 401(k) accounts. But, absent such fundamental change, it is
difficult to envision any reversal of the stagnation of the defined benefit
system.
Similarly, no one today proposes expansion of Social Security
benefits.212 Those opposed to incorporating individual accounts into the
Social Security system are fighting a defensive battle for the defined benefit
status quo, not suggesting an enlargement of the payments promised by that
system. Indeed, thoughtful proponents of the current defined benefit
configuration for Social Security generally advocate benefit reductions
rather than individual accounts to restore the long-term solvency of Social
Security. 13 If advocates of the defined benefit status quo did suggest an
enlargement of Social Security payments, it is unlikely they would be taken
seriously.
210. Halperin, supra note 15, at 72; see also Martin A. Sullivan, Pols Maneuver To Protect
and Increase Pensions, 95 TAx NOTES 822, 826 (2002).
211. See Universal and Portable Pension Act of 2002, H.R. 4482, 107th Cong. (2002); see
also Pratt, supra note 207, § 3.13[4]-[5]; Sullivan, supra note 210, at 825-26.
212. Cf Halperin, supra note 15, at 39 ("[I]t is unlikely that future Social Security benefits
will achieve full income replacement. Because payroll tax revenues dedicated to Social Security
are in the long run insufficient to provide for promised benefits, it is more likely that future
benefits will be less than the level of benefits currently promised by the program." (footnote
omitted)).
213. See, e.g., Aaron, supra note 36, at 89-95.
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K. Conclusion: The Significance of Enron
In light of the foregoing, consider the collapse of Enron, an event that
provoked Congress to quickly pass securities law and accounting reforms.
If any event were going to stimulate a serious effort to revive the defined
benefit paradigm, it would have been l'affaire Enron, as thousands of Enron
employees, their 401(k) accounts stuffed with Enron stock, saw their
retirement savings evaporate.214 Here, in a very visible nutshell, were the
dangers of the defined contribution paradigm, under which employees have
no guaranteed benefits prefunded in accordance with actuarial standards
and are subject to the vagaries of investment, funding, and longevity risk.
The plight of Enron's employees was a subject of intense national
attention.2 15 However, this attention has resulted in no action to halt the
decline of the defined benefit system. Instead, after Enron, the movement
toward the defined contribution society continues. It was after Enron that
President Bush advanced his proposals for reemployment accounts, for the
consolidation and expansion of existing defined contribution devices, and
for legislation legitimating cash balance plans. Similarly, post-Enron, the
Treasury proposed regulations widely understood as giving a green light to
the conversion of traditional defined benefit plans to cash balance
arrangements. The often heated opposition to the proposed cash balance
regulations, now apparently superseded by the President's legislative
proposal, focused upon issues of transition and age discrimination, i.e.,
whether the transformation of traditional defined benefit plans to the cash
balance motif is fair to older workers caught up in that transformation.
Virtually no one opposes cash balance plans per se, a sure sign that the
defined contribution format, which the cash balance arrangement emulates,
has been accepted as the prevailing norm.
Some members of Congress do pursue legislation to help resuscitate the
defined benefit paradigm, but their efforts, even if enacted into law, seem
likely to have minor effects at best. The typical post-Enron reform proposal
214. See Millon, supra note 2, at 853 ("Enron graphically illustrates the risks workers face
when they over-invest their pension savings in their company's stock."); Reece, supra note 90, at
82 ("Most of the sensation concerning the unfortunate employees at Enron revolves around the
losses they have experienced in their 401(k) plans."); Stabile, supra note 90, at 824 ("As a result,
many [Enron] participants lost between seventy and ninety percent of their retirement funds.").
215. See, e.g., Hearing on Retirement Security and Defined Benefit Pension Plans Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. 66 (2002) (statement of Jonathan Skinner,
Professor, Dartmouth Coll. and Med. Sch.), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
binigetdoc.cgi?dbname=107_househearings&docid=f:8658 l.pdf ("[T]he Enron debacle has
focused attention on what is the most serious charge against 401(k) plans, that they are just too
risky for use in retirement planning.").
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has been to tweak the 401(k) framework, not to resurrect defined benefit
plans.
2 16
In short, while Enron elicited an immediate congressional response in
some areas, 2 7 it has not resulted in any serious reconsideration of the now-
sustained trend toward the defined contribution paradigm. Enron was a
watershed event for that paradigm, confirming the permanence and
preeminence of the defined contribution format. If no serious effort to
resuscitate defined benefit plans and to deemphasize individual account
arrangements is forthcoming after Enron, none is likely to be forthcoming.
IV. WHAT DOES IT MEAN?: CONSUMPTION TAXATION,
TAX EXPENDITURES, AND THE POSSIBLE FUTURES
OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
In this Part, I place the defined contribution paradigm in the context of
contemporary debate about consumption taxation and tax expenditures and
discuss the prospects of the paradigm in light of the possible futures of the
Internal Revenue Code. Among tax commentators and policy analysts, no
topic is more hotly debated today than the advisability of shifting the
federal tax base from income to consumption.218 Prominent voices argue
that converting the Internal Revenue Code to a consumption base would
enhance efficiency and equity while simplifying the tax law.219 Under what
is commonly denoted a cash flow consumption tax, there would no longer
be separate accounts for savings for particular purposes, such as retirement,
health, or education. Rather, every taxpayer (with earned income or not)
would undertake all of her savings through either or both of two kinds of
accounts: those subject to the conventional tax-deferral regime (deduction
on contribution, tax-free accumulation of earnings, taxation upon
withdrawal from the account), or the alternative, economically equivalent
pattern reflected in the treatment of Roth, § 529, and educational savings
accounts (post tax contributions, tax-free accumulation of earnings, tax-free
216. See, e.g., Pension Security Act of 2003, H.R. 1000, 108th Cong. (2003); Jefferson, supra
note 25, § 10.05; Reece, supra note 90.
217. Most prominently, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 2002
U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 745 (to be codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29
U.S.C.).
218. The literature on cash flow consumption taxation is now voluminous. Among seminal
contributions to that literature are William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow
Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974); Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a
Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575 (1979); and Alvin Warren, Would a
Consumption Tax Be Fairer than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081 (1980).
219. See, e.g., Bruce Bartlett, Explaining the Bush Tax Cuts, COMMENTARY, June 2004, at
23, 27; see also Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Three Versions of Tax Reform, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV.
157. 166 (1997).
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withdrawals). Thus, under the cash flow consumption tax, there would no
longer be distinctions, in theory or in practice, among savings for particular
purposes because all savings would receive one of these tax treatments.
Likewise, under a cash flow consumption tax, there would be no limits on
the amount that any taxpayer could save through such accounts, because tax
would be deferred 220 on all saved income until such saved income was
consumed.22
Equally prominent voices opposing a consumption tax base contend
that, as a matter of distributional fairness, the federal fisc should tax all
income when earned or received, including saved income.222 Because it is
more affluent taxpayers who save, exempting saved income from the tax
base potentially skews the effective tax burden away from these more
prosperous taxpayers toward lower-income nonsavers. Yet other important
voices characterize the existing tax code as a hybrid tax, in some respects
an income tax that taxes saved income, in other respects a consumption tax
that defers the taxation of saved income until such saved income is
subsequently used for consumption.223
My survey of the defined contribution paradigm suggests a fourth
perspective: For middle- and upper-middle-class households, the federal
government levies a de facto consumption tax today because these
households can effectively conduct all their financial savings on a tax-
deferred (or equivalent) basis via the individual account devices of the
defined contribution paradigm. In terms of financial savings,224 middle-
class families save principally for retirement and to educate their offspring.
This saving today occurs largely through tax-deferred devices such as
401(k) accounts, 403(b) accounts, § 529 plans, IRAs, and cash balance
pensions. Under these devices, the taxpayer's saving receives either the
traditional tax-deferred treatment of qualified plans and IRAs or the
economically equivalent alternative. Either way, these families receive
consumption tax treatment for their savings. For these families, little would
in practice change if the Code were transformed into a true consumption
tax; they effectively live under a federal consumption tax regime today.
220. The alternative treatment is equivalent to deferral, assuming stable tax rates.
221. See Mitchell L. Engler & Michael S. Knoll, Simplifying the Transition to a
(Progressive) Consumption Tax, 56 SMU L. REv. 53, 62 (2003) ("The principal change required
to the existing tax base is the expansion of the current tax treatment of qualified accounts-such
as IRAs, 401(k)s, etc.-to all investments, in effect providing an unlimited deduction for new
savings." (footnote omitted)).
222. Warren, supra note 219, at 166 ("Income tax proponents have responded that the
consumption tax would be regressive and therefore unfair, because higher income individuals save
more.").
223. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax,
70 TEX. L. REv. 1145 (1992).
224. As opposed to savings in the form of housing appreciation and mortgage amortization.
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Because the families in the bottom half of the income spectrum
generally do not undertake financial savings, and because middle- and
upper-middle-income households can save on a consumption tax basis
through the tax-deferring mechanisms of the defined contribution paradigm,
only the wealthiest taxpayers, who save in excess of the amounts permitted
under these individual account mechanisms, are subject to current income
taxation on saved income.225
A cash flow consumption tax226 would represent the ultimate extension,
indeed the triumph, of the defined contribution paradigm, because all
savings would occur through individual accounts. It is precisely because of
their experience with that paradigm that taxpayers might view a federal
consumption tax as an incremental extension of their encounters with IRAs,
401(k) arrangements, and other individual accounts such as § 529 and
403(b) accounts.
Consider in this context President Bush's proposals to consolidate and
expand the various individual accounts authorized under federal tax law,
proposals that have been characterized as radical innovations.227 In fact, the
Bush proposals are quite incremental in nature. While they would enlarge,
simplify, and combine the extant forms of individual accounts, the resulting
changes would expand existing patterns of tax-deferred savings, not
initiate new patterns. The Bush proposals thus institutionalize and reinforce
the consumption tax features of the Code rather than break sharply from
current law.
Despite their incremental nature, the Bush proposals are noteworthy
insofar as they would weaken the link between the individual account
devices of the defined contribution paradigm and savings for particular
purposes. The Bush proposals would thereby move the Code closer to a
pattern of generalized deferral for savings as such.228 As we have seen, in
225. Even this statement must be qualified. Much investment income takes the form of
dividends and capital gains, taxed at preference rates. I.R.C. § 1(h) (2000). The effective tax rates
on some investment earnings can be lowered by deferring tax by avoiding realizations. See
Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism, and the Virtue of
Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 861 (1997). Yet other investment income, most
prominently municipal bond interest, is excluded from gross income. I.R.C. § 103(a).
226. As opposed to a value-added tax, a retail sales tax, or any similar consumption levy.
227. E.g., Heather Bennett, Bush To Renew Call for Savings Accounts but Details Await
Budget Release, TAx NOTES TODAY, Feb. 2, 2004, 2004 TNT 21-6 (LEXIS) (quoting Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy Pamela F. Olson on the "radical change" sought by the
Bush Administration through its savings account proposals).
228. This is not the only significant issue raised by the Bush proposals. For example, by
increasing the ability of entrepreneurs to save on a tax-deferred basis on their own, the Bush
proposals, if enacted, would discourage some business owners from establishing qualified plans at
the workplace, because these owners would themselves no longer need work-based plans to defer
tax on saved income. See Martin A. Sullivan, Budget Preview: Are LSAs Coming to Town?, 101
TAx NOTES 1255, 1259 (2003) ("So because RSAs and LSAs would give small employers
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their current incarnation, each form of individual account implements
savings for a specific end: Section 529 accounts effect savings for the costs
of higher education, 401(k) and 403(b) accounts implement savings for
retirement, MSAs and HSAs are used to save for health costs, and so on.
The Bush proposals, in contrast, would to a large degree decouple savings
from particular purposes, permitting tax-deferred savings per se.229 Such
decoupling would move the Code closer to consumption tax norms by
extending tax deferral to savings as such rather than conditioning such tax
deferral on the future purpose for which savings are to be used.
But even here the Bush proposals are more incremental in nature than
first appears. In important respects, Congress has already moved toward
consumption tax norms by attenuating the links between tax deferral and
the particular purposes animating tax-deferred savings, thereby pointing
toward generalized tax deferral for savings as such. Congress, for example,
has chipped away at the notion that retirement savings are just for
retirement. In I.R.C. § 72(t), Congress has exempted from the ten percent
penalty tax on premature distributions those qualified plan and IRA
distributions used for tax-deductible medical expenses. 230 Congress has also
exempted from this penalty tax IRA withdrawals used for certain higher
education expenses, 231 for limited down payments for first-time home
buyers,232 and for health insurance premiums for certain unemployed
persons.233 The message that emerges from § 72(t) is that "pension" savings
are properly used prior to retirement for other pressing needs.
Less explicit, but equally revealing, is the extent to which Congress has
condoned the use of qualified plan and IRA resources for testamentary
transmissions of wealth. To a degree, the minimum required distribution
(MRD) rules of I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(A) discourage individuals from hoarding
their qualified plan and IRA resources for transfer at death to their children.
In particular, the MRD rules require that payment of retirement amounts
must commence after the participant has attained her "required beginning
date," the later of age seventy and one-half or the participant's actual
retirement date.234 Thus, an employee, unless she works until she dies,
significantly greater capacity to save for retirement outside of a pension plan, many pension
experts believe the enactment of RSAs and LSAs would reduce pension coverage.").
229. Id. at 1256-57.
230. I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(B). Distributions are exempted from tax to the extent they are
allowable as a deduction under I.R.C. § 213. Id.
231. Id. § 72(t)(2)(E).
232. Id. § 72(t)(2)(F).
233. Id. § 72(t)(2)(D).
234. Id. § 401(a)(9)(C)(i). The precise statutory requirement is that distributions must
commence by April 1 of the calendar year of the participant's required beginning date. Id. If the
participant owns five percent or more of the employer sponsoring the qualified plan, his required
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cannot simply hold intact her individual account235 to convey it on death,
but must begin withdrawals (and pay income tax on such withdrawals)
while alive.
In practice, however, the MRD rules are a minimal impediment to the
testamentary transmission of individual account wealth. Most obviously,
the MRD mandate that distributions must commence after the account
holder's required beginning date does not apply to Roth IRAs. 36
Consequently, an individual who views her Roth IRA as a device for
transmitting wealth to her offspring can hold that account intact (generating
income-tax-deferred earnings) until her death and then leave that Roth
account to her descendants.
Moreover, in the early years after the required beginning date, the MRD
rules permit a testamentarily inclined account holder to withdraw quite
small amounts based on her life expectancy 237 and thereby preserve the
238balance of the account for her heirs. Thus, even when the MRD rules
apply, the individual account of the defined contribution paradigm is a
potentially potent device for transmitting wealth at death.
At the most fundamental level, Congress's willingness to condone lump
sum distributions in lieu of annuities implicitly countenances the
testamentary transmission of individual account wealth. So far, I have
emphasized the longevity risk created by lump sums, i.e., the possibility
that individuals will outlive their retirement resources. But congressionally
condoned lump sums also create the possibility that retirement resources
beginning date is age seventy and one-half, with no option to extend that date by delaying
retirement. Id. § 401(a)(9)(C)(ii).
235. The MRD rules apply to conventional IRAs by virtue of I.R.C. § 408(a)(6). The MRD
rules do not apply to Roth IRAs. They do apply to 403(b) annuities and § 457 plans. Id. §§
403(b)(10), 457(d)(2).
236. Id. § 408A(c)(5).
237. Id. § 401(a)(9)(B), implemented by Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-5 (2002).
238. Consider, for example, a widowed IRA holder who has an IRA balance of $100,000 at
age seventy-one. The MRD rules require this widow in the current year to withdraw from the IRA
and pay federal income tax on $3774 (because $100,000/26.5 = $3774, see Treas. Reg.
§ 1.401(a)(9)-9 (as amended 2002)). Thus, if the account earns a return in that year of four
percent, the account balance actually increases, because the mandated distribution is less than the
year's earnings. True, the account will not grow as much as it would have absent the required
distribution. On the other hand, that required distribution does not impair the amount available for
testamentary transmission. Moreover, after this widow's death, the IRA balance transferred to her
child can, under the MRD regime, be distributed and taxed to that child on a favorable basis. If,
for example, the widowed IRA holder dies survived by a forty-year-old child, he may inherit the
IRA and may spread withdrawals from the inherited IRA (and thus defer income taxes) over a
period of 43.6 years, reflecting his life expectancy. In this fashion, the child may continue
favorable tax treatment of the inherited IRA for the remainder of his lifetime. If the inherited IRA
balance is still $100,000 when received by the child, the child, given his life expectancy of over
forty years, must, in the first year after his mother's death, withdraw from his inherited IRA only
$2294 (because $100,000/43.6 = $2294). If the IRA earns on its investments a minimum rate of
two-and-one-half percent during that year, the IRA balance will actually increase, despite the
required withdrawal based on the child's life expectancy.
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will outlive the individual. Annuities terminate on the death of the
participant (or of the participant's spouse), leaving nothing for the
participant's children. In contrast, lump sums create the possibility (in some
cases, the likelihood) 39 that, on the demise of the participant (or of the
participant's spouse), a lump sum balance will remain for the participant's
heirs. Thus, the congressionally approved movement from annuities to
lump sums has increased the utility of individual account devices for
testamentary purposes, because lump sums carry the possibility of balances
transmittable at the participant's death, unlike annuities that terminate at the
participant's death.240
To summarize: Proponents of a federal cash flow consumption tax can
plausibly characterize the individual account devices of the defined
contribution paradigm as the harbinger of such a tax. For most middle- and
upper-middle-class families, individual accounts already create a de facto
consumption tax because those families can undertake nearly all of their
financial savings on a tax-deferred basis via these accounts. Congress's
willingness to condone the use of pension and IRA resources for purposes
other than retirement-medical care, education, first-time home buying,
testamentary transfers-can plausibly be viewed as steps toward a true
consumption tax under which all savings, regardless of purpose, receive tax
deferral or equivalent treatment. President Bush's proposals would move
the Code further toward consumption tax norms, both by increasing
quantitative limits on the amounts that can be saved on a tax-deferred basis
and by weakening the link between tax deferral and particular purposes for
saving.
The debate about the propriety of consumption taxation has paralleled
the simultaneous controversy about tax expenditure analysis. 24 1 Tax
expenditure analysis starts from the premise that the Code does and should
239. Consider, for example, a two-earner couple who have amassed substantial resources in
their respective 401(k) accounts, who defer withdrawals until their required beginning dates, and
who withdraw at the minimum rate based on life expectancy. There is a substantial possibility that
one member of this couple will leave a significant 401(k) balance on his or her death.
240. MUNNELL & SUNDAN, supra note 68, at 154 ("Bequests are likely to increase as retirees
receive more of their pension benefits as lump sums rather than as annuity payments.").
241. For a small sample of the now-voluminous literature on tax expenditure analysis, see
STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985); Boris I. Bittker,
Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244 (1969);
David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE
L.J. 955 (2004); Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax "Benefits" Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct
Expenditures?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 379 (1998); and Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and
Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions,
102 YALE L.J. 1165 (1993).
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tax income242 and further contends that deductions, exemptions, and
exclusions constitute "tax expenditures" when these provisions are intended
not to measure the taxpayer's income but to pursue policies extraneous to
such income measurement. Proponents of this perspective typically cite the
Code provisions concerning qualified plans as a quintessential tax
expenditure, a subsidy for retirement savings rather than an appropriate part
of a normative income tax.
There are those who dispute in general the utility of the tax expenditure
label243 and those who question in particular the application of that label to
the Code provisions governing qualified plans.2 " What cannot be gainsaid
is that tax expenditure analysis is now deeply embedded in the federal 245
and state246 budgetary processes and in the academic understanding of the
tax law,247 and that tax expenditure budgets classify the qualified plan
provisions of current law as among the largest subsidies administered
through the federal tax law.248
From this perspective, the defined contribution paradigm is an elaborate
subsidy mechanism, delivering tax expenditures through the income tax to
those who contribute to and retain assets in tax-favored individual accounts.
The costs and benefits of such tax-based subsidies have been much debated.
For purposes of the present discussion, the most salient fact is the
distributional implication of those subsidies. Professor Surrey, the founder
of tax expenditure analysis, denoted the distributional consequences of tax
expenditures in a powerful sound bite as "upside-down": 249 Tax deductions,
exclusions, and exemptions provide the greatest subsidies to high-bracket
taxpayers who, absent such deductions, exclusions, and exemptions, pay tax
at the highest rates. If the defined contribution paradigm represents a tax
expenditure, Surrey's distributional concerns carry force, because the prime
beneficiaries of the paradigm are families and individuals who can afford to
242. The key premise of tax expenditure analysis-the division of tax provisions into the
normative and the subsidizing--can be applied to any tax. In practice, Stanley Surrey and his
followers have devoted the bulk of their attention to income taxation.
243. The most prominent of these opponents is Boris Bittker. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note
241.
244. See supra note 56.
245. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 639(c)(3) (2000).
246. One commentator indicates that thirty-three states today prepare tax expenditure
budgets. Herman P. Ayayo, Tax Expenditures: Useful Economic Concept or Budgetary
Dinosaur?, 93 TAX NOTES 1152, 1153 (2001).
247. See, e.g., WILLIAM D. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 401-14 (5th ed.
1999).
248. See, e.g., Hearing on Oversight of Various Pension Issues Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means Subcomm. on Oversight, 105th Cong. 160 (1998) (statement of David Wray,
President, Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of Am.) (characterizing "the exclusion of employer
contributions to a qualified plan and the earnings on plan assets" as "the largest tax expenditure
figure in the tables").
249. SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 241, at 71.
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save, the same affluent high-bracket beneficiaries of tax preferences like the
mortgage interest deduction.250
From either the consumption tax or the tax expenditure perspective, the
prospects of the defined contribution paradigm are intimately tied to the
future of the Code of which the paradigm is now a central feature. The most
likely future of the Code is the continuation of the status quo, whether that
status quo is considered to be a proto-consumption tax or an imperfect
income tax laden with tax preferences. Under either characterization, the
defined contribution paradigm is an important contributor to and product of
the status quo. It is unlikely that Congress will upset that status quo by
jettisoning the individual account devices of the defined contribution
paradigm, as this would defeat the expectations and raise the taxes of
Congress's middle-class constituents. As mechanisms that (depending on
your premise) afford consumption tax treatment to middle-income
taxpayers or give such taxpayers expenditure-type subsidies for savings,
those mechanisms are now deeply embedded in the tax law and American
society.
If the most likely possibility for the Code is the continuation of the
status quo, the next most piobable possibility is the formal conversion of
the Code to a cash flow consumption tax providing generalized tax deferral
(or its equivalent) for all savings. The conversion of the Code to a formal
cash flow consumption tax would constitute the ultimate triumph of the
defined contribution paradigm because all savings would be conducted
through individual accounts. Indeed, if the public does acquiesce to the
formal conversion of the Code to a thoroughgoing consumption tax, that
acquiescence would flow from the public's experience with the defined
contribution paradigm, an experience that has acclimated the public to the
notion of tax-deferred savings accounts. As we have seen, an important
dynamic in the evolution of the paradigm has been the incremental
expansion of individual accounts. That expansion has, step by step, made
feasible policies that would otherwise have seemed to have been sharp
breaks from the status quo. Thus, for example, the IRA begat the MSA,251
which gave rise to the HSA.252 The conversion of the Code to a formal
consumption tax would be the ultimate step in this incremental process, a
step for which the public was prepared for a generation by its experience
with individual accounts such as IRAs, 401(k) and 403(b) accounts, and
§ 529 programs.
250. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(5) (2000).
251. See supra notes 130-141 and accompanying text.
252. See supra Section 111.1.
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If the Code were changed to a true cash flow consumption tax,
employer-sponsored plans would largely become a thing of the past,
because any taxpayer could, without limit, replicate for herself the tax
results of such plans. 253 There would, accordingly, be no tax-based
attraction to such plans. Here a paradox arises: Under a cash flow
consumption tax, the employer-sponsored plan with the greatest utility, and
thus the highest chance of survival, would be the traditional defined benefit
pension that, by shifting investment, funding, and longevity risk to the
employer, performs a unique economic function, desired by some
(particularly older) employees. This niche function, attractive to employers
seeking older workers, might keep some traditional defined benefit plans
alive under a cash flow consumption tax.
If the two most likely futures for the Internal Revenue Code are the
status quo and the formal conversion of the Code to a true consumption tax,
two less likely possibilities are the conversion of the Code to an accretionist
income tax, which taxes unrealized appreciation,254 and the substitution for
the current Code of a national value-added tax (VAT).
The impact of an accretionist tax on the defined contribution paradigm
would depend critically upon the scope of the accretionist regime, i.e.,
whether that regime would apply to qualified plans and individual account
devices or whether unrealized gains would be taxed only outside such plans
and accounts. In the latter case, qualified plans and other individual
accounts would stand out as tax-favored vehicles, refuges from the rigors of
accretionist taxation. This would reinforce, the defined contribution
framework. On the other hand, if qualified plans and individual accounts
were subject to immediate taxation on their (realized and unrealized)
earnings and if participants were taxed on accrued but as-yet-unpaid
benefits, we could expect that, unless directly subsidized, qualified plans
and individual accounts would (except for some niche defined benefit plans
designed to attract older workers) likely atrophy and die when stripped of
tax advantage.
Of all the possibilities for the future, a federal VAT is the scenario that
poses the most dire threat to the defined contribution paradigm. I agree with
Professors Roin and Forman that, in this scenario, most employer plans
would be likely to disappear, as the abolition of the income tax would strip
253. Professor Forman agrees that a cash flow consumption tax would likely lead to the
demise of most employer-sponsored pension plans. Jonathan B. Forman, The Impact of Shifting to
a Personal Consumption Tax on Pension Plans and Their Beneficiaries, in TAX REFORM:
IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC SECURITY AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 51, 51-53 (Dallas L.
Salisbury ed., 1997).
254. I discuss this possibility in Zelinsky, supra note 225.
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such plans of any tax advantage.255 Again, the ironic exception would be a
relatively small number of traditional defined benefit plans likely to persist
under a VAT as niche devices for attracting older workers particularly
attuned to such plans.
As to other kinds of individual accounts, unless Congress elected to
provide direct subsidies to such accounts, these too would likely disappear
under a VAT, though the insurance industry might still find it desirable to
market HRAs. Thus, of the possibilities for the future, the stand-alone VAT
regime is the greatest threat to the defined contribution paradigm in its
current form.
A final observation about the defined contribution system going
forward-that system is an important cause of complexity in the current tax
law; there is, in light of the foregoing, little chance of simplifying this area.
Under the likely possibilities-continuation of the status quo or movement
toward an explicit cash flow consumption tax-the network of individual
accounts will, in one form or another, continue indefinitely. There are good
reasons to be skeptical of the feasibility or desirability of tax
simplification.256 The existence and popularity of the defined contribution
paradigm is one more reason for such skepticism.
V. WHAT SHOULD WE Do?
A. Clarifying Premises
In this last Part, I explore our choices for molding the defined
contribution paradigm for the future and identify which of those choices I
think are best. Since those choices necessarily rest on premises about the
defined contribution paradigm and the persons affected by that paradigm,
let me try to make my premises as explicit as I can.
First, the defined contribution paradigm has its advantages, not least
that it exists, that it corresponds to Americans' cultural norms about
individual ownership and control, and that it works well for many
Americans. Despite my misgivings about the paradigm's shifting of risk to
employees poorly suited to handle those risks, there is little chance-today,
for the foreseeable future, probably indefinitely-of revitalizing the defined
benefit model. Indeed, after Enron, the absence of any serious effort to
255. See Forman, supra note 253, at 51-53; Roin, supra note 138, at 328 ("Given that
employer pension plans are expensive to administer, employers and employees may both decide
they are better off letting workers save for their own retirement independent of the workplace.").
256. It is a commonplace in discussion of tax simplification that there is no constituency for
simplification because most everyone has higher priorities, priorities which often make for greater
complexity. For a recent discussion, see Zelinsky, supra note 4.
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revive traditional defined benefit plans is the Holmesian2 57 dog that did not
bark. Any program for the future must start with the acknowledgment that
the private retirement system going forward will predominantly reflect the
defined contribution paradigm.
Second, I think heavy-handed paternalism in matters of private
retirement savings is unwarranted and generally counterproductive, but that
there is room to improve individuals' decisions about retirement savings if
done in a reasonably careful and subtle way. There is today in the legal
academy no more heated debate than whether man is the rational, competent
utility maximizer of traditional economic theory, capable of pursuing his
own interests, or the cognitively impaired being of behavioral economics,
potentially benefiting from a heavy dollop of paternalism. 258 For my analysis
people are both rational utility maximizers and the cognitively impaired
beings of behavioral economics. Standard economic theory is a powerful
predictor of human behavior because, in many settings, people are rational
self-maximizers, responding to incentives and disincentives in methodical,
consistent, and sensible ways. The power of the emerging behavioralist
perspective is to demonstrate that irrationality, when it occurs, often occurs
in systematic and predictable (if not sensible) ways-although, even when
most people are behaving illogically, many are not.
On balance, I conclude that, in the context of the private retirement
system, the strongest forms of paternalism are not warranted (many people
do behave rationally), 259 nor is heavy-handed paternalism likely to succeed
(people can opt out of the system if its restrictions chafe too much). Most
obviously, if 401(k) plans are perceived as overly restrictive, employees can
decline to participate in them.
On the other hand, there is room for improving the retirement choices
of many people if the rules are formulated and implemented with
reasonable care and subtlety. Retirement is a complex topic-individuals
who can make rational decisions about simpler aspects of their lives are less
than optimal decisionmakers in this complicated area. Feedback from
retirement savings decisions is often long delayed-the value of retirement
savings undertaken when an individual is in her thirties will not be manifest
for most of her working career. Aging is the ultimate nonrepeat game-the
sixty-five-year-old who suddenly realizes that she did not save enough
257. Sherlock, not Oliver Wendell. See ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE
ADVENTURES AND THE MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 277, 296 (Penguin Books 2001) (1894)
("That was the curious incident .... (internal quotation marks omitted)).
258. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97
Nw. U. L. REV. 1165 (2003).
259. See, e.g., William G. Gale, Comment, in BEHAVIORAL DIMENSIONS OF RETIREMENT
ECONOMICS 116, 116-20 (Henry J. Aaron ed., 1999).
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when younger does not get a second chance. And, as this example suggests,
individuals' preferences may be time inconsistent-current consumption
can look more valuable when one is younger than it does with the benefit of
hindsight. 6° In short, we must search for essentially noncoercive ways of
guiding individuals' retirement decisions, nudging them over any cognitive
hurdles without succumbing to the temptation of overbearing
paternalism.
261
Third, in this area, there is a need for greater sensitivity to the costs of
regulation than has occurred in the past. The dilemma retirement
policymakers face, reflective of a broader problem of regulation generally,
is that each particular act of regulation can be justified as responding to a
compelling concern. Cumulatively, however, the aggregation of regulations
(each plausible on its own) makes for a legal framework of daunting
complexity that deters the creation and maintenance of the plans being
regulated. Well-meaning mandates, each arguably justifiable individually,
can cumulatively overburden the plans those mandates are designed to
improve. In the final analysis, employers' decisions to maintain and
establish defined contribution plans are voluntary; if the costs of such plans
outweigh the perceived benefits, employers will abandon such plans or will
not establish them in the first place. The same is true of accounts
maintained by individuals. If the rules are too onerous, some (perhaps
many) will eschew them.
Finally, I believe it confuses, rather than helps, to label current law vis-
d-vis qualified plans as a tax expenditure. Under the provisions of current
law, tax-deferred saving within qualified plans is typically more attractive
than is taxable saving outside such plans. This advantage to accumulating
within qualified plans underpins the conventional characterization of the
Code as creating a qualified plan tax expenditure. However, the provisions
of current law can be understood not as an effort to subsidize pension and
profit-sharing arrangements, but as a plausible (perhaps the best) selection
from among the range of practical alternatives for taxing such
arrangements. 62 Indeed, those who crafted the existing income tax
treatment of qualified plans did not seek to subsidize such plans, but rather
sought to tax such plans and their participants in a fair and administrable
fashion.263
260. On procrastination and time-inconsistent preferences for retirement savings, see Ted
O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Procrastination in Preparing for Retirement, in BEHAVIORAL
DIMENSIONS OF RETIREMENT ECONOMICS, supra note 259, at 125.
261. Professors Sunstein and Thaler come to similar conclusions. Sunstein & Thaler, supra
note 17, at 1201.
262. See supra note 56.
263. See WOOTEN, supra note 39.
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Moreover, in the years since Surrey first propounded the tax
expenditure label, there has been a noted shift in political and academic
opinion toward the ideal of consumption taxation.264 In a world
characterized by a strong consensus that income is the desired tax base,
those labeling current law as a tax expenditure for qualified plans plausibly
invoke an idealized version of that base. Under that idealized income tax
base, all savings would be taxed currently as they accrue-a theoretical
treatment far from the reality of current law, under which the taxation of
qualified plan savings is delayed (perhaps for a long time) until the
participant actually receives his plan distribution.
However, starting from the premise that consumption should be taxed,
the Code's treatment of qualified plans looks not like a subsidizing
departure from the theoretical income tax norm that all savings should be
taxed immediately, but rather like a harbinger of a consumption tax under
which all saving would be treated as are qualified plans today. In short,
placing the label "tax expenditure" on the present tax treatment of qualified
plans is conclusory and problematic.
Perhaps most seriously, that label obscures the nature of the decisions
that are embedded in current law and that we confront for the future. The
tax expenditure label allows paternalistic pension regulation to be defended
without confronting its paternalistic nature. Rather, subsidy rhetoric allows
such regulation to be characterized merely as the government guaranteeing
that it receives something for its tax-based assistance.265 In contrast, I think
that, if we choose to be paternalistic, we should be open and explicit about
that choice, not obscuring such paternalism with subsidy rhetoric.
B. The Program
From these premises, I propose the following program:
(1) Do no harm. The most important imperative for the future is to do
no harm. That leads me to skepticism about numerous suggestions that are
plausible (indeed, anodyne) at first blush but that, upon further reflection,
appear problematic. Consider, for example, the now-widespread consensus
that, in a world of individual accounts, 401(k) and IRA holders need
266investment education. From this consensus, it is a short step to mandating
that employers provide such education.
264. See supra notes 218-221 and accompanying text.
265. See Orszag & Stein, supra note 29, at 650 ("[M]ost analysts and policy-makers agree
that qualified pension plans generate tax expenditures. As such, non-discrimination rules and
other forms of regulation are warranted.").
266. See Janice Kay Lawrence, Pension Reform in the Aftermath of Enron: Congress'
Failure To Deliver the Promise of Secure Retirement to 401(k) Plan Participants, 92 KY. L.J. 1,
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But not so fast. Education is not costless. Someone must pay for it.
Either employers will absorb the costs of investor education for their
employees or those costs will be passed onto employees via lower wages or
lower employer contributions. And there is, as yet, no hard evidence that
such mass education will in practice accomplish enough to justify its not
inconsiderable costs. Before mandating such education, we need rigorous
proof that the results are likely to justify the costs. Without such data, a
mandate for employer-provided investor education looks suspiciously like a
windfall for the providers of that mandated education.
Similar observations are to be made about proposals for mandatory
annuitization, i.e., for requiring that, in lieu of lump sum distributions,
participants must purchase annuity contracts with her qualified plan or IRA
balance. Again, at first blush, such proposals are a plausible response to the
problems of longevity risk and adverse selection. If everyone is required to
purchase an annuity with their respective individual account balances, the
adverse selection problem disappears, because everyone (whether likely to
be long lived or not) must buy an annuity.267
But there is a potential flaw in this happy scenario, and it is a big one:
Mandatory annuitization may deter some, perhaps many, employees from
participating in defined contribution plans or individual retirement accounts
by imposing a restriction they consider onerous. In its simplest incarnation,
mandatory annuitization would eliminate the possibility of accessing
retirement resources early by permitting withdrawals only on retirement
and only in annuity form.
In response to these concerns, one can envision less stringent proposals
for mandatory annuitization, like requiring such annuitization only after age
fifty. But under that regime many participants would take distributions in
their late forties to avoid forced annuitization, even though they would have
left their retirement savings untouched in the absence of the annuitization
requirement. Under this scenario, mandatory annuitization might actually
cause greater pre-retirement consumption of plan distributions than would
otherwise be the case. This, of course, would not be the first instance of
qualified plan regulation generating unintended consequences.
Likewise, proposals for PBGC-type insurance for defined contribution
plans are attractive when considered in isolation and without weighing their
13 (2003); Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Investment Without Education: The Disparate Impact on
Women and Minorities in Self-Directed Defined Contribution Plans, 5 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP.
POL'Y J. 223,268 (2001).
267. Furthermore, if everyone were forced to buy an annuity, it is probable that, in at least
some contexts (e.g., large 401(k) plans), plans would negotiate for annuity contracts on a
centralized basis, thereby minimizing administrative costs and sales fees. Or perhaps, as the
market for annuities expanded, competitive pressures would force the insurance industry to pass
on to purchasers the resulting economies of scale.
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possible secondary effects. 268 But someone will be required to pay for this
insurance. If we charge employers or their 401(k) plans for those costs, as
well as the expenses of investment education and the burden of mandatory
annuitization rules, we change the cost-benefit calculation of such plans for
employers and participants, perhaps to the detriment of maintaining such
plans or participating in them.
If, on the other hand, government-sponsored insurance for defined
contribution plans is a voluntary program, we must confront the failure of
the private sector to provide such insurance. That the commercial insurance
market has not generated such coverage suggests that publicly provided
defined contribution insurance also is likely to flunk the test of the market
and will eventually require subsidization either from the public treasury or
from the universe of defined contribution plans. Neither alternative seems
attractive.
In short, "do no harm" is not a bromide but a caution to avoid repeating
the overregulation that made departure from the defined benefit format so
attractive. The pathway to overregulation is paved with good intentions. We
should be reluctant to replicate this experience with defined contribution
arrangements.
(2) Amend § 401(k) to require elections out. While I would eschew
many well-meaning but potentially counterproductive changes to the rules
governing defined contribution plans, I would amend § 401(k) in one
important respect: to require employees to opt out of 401(k) participation.
Under current law, most 401(k) plans require the employee to elect plan
coverage; absent such an election, the default rule for most plans is
nonparticipation.
There is now substantial evidence that the opposite approach, making
participation the default rule,269 increases employees' coverage under
401(k) arrangements. 270 Employees who procrastinate about opting in also
procrastinate about electing out. Hence, there is much to be gained by
defining a 401(k) plan as an arrangement from which the employee must
affirmatively withdraw by electing current cash salary rather than an
equivalent plan contribution on her behalf.
Unlike the reforms I reject as potentially imposing significant burdens
on employers and participants, defining the § 401(k) default rule as
participation does not constitute overbearing paternalism. Under such a
268. See, e.g., Regina T. Jefferson, Rethinking the Risk of Defined Contribution Plans, 4 FLA.
TAX REV. 607 (2000) (proposing voluntary insurance coverage for defmed contribution plans).
269. The IRS has specifically approved automatic enrollment 401(k) plans under which
participation is the default rule if the employee makes no election. See Rev. Rul. 2000-8, 2000-1
C.B. 617; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-l(a)(3)(ii), 68 Fed. Reg. 42,476, 42,489-90 (July 17, 2003).
270. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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rule, the employee can choose to depart from the plan and thereby take
current cash compensation in lieu of a plan contribution on her behalf.
Moreover, a 401(k) default rule that puts employees in the plan unless they
affirmatively elect out might be as easy or easier for employers to
administer than the default rule that requires employees to opt in. This
suggests that many, perhaps most, 401 (k) sponsors will eventually, on their
own, gravitate toward the rule under which plan participation is presumed
unless the employee elects out.
On balance, however, I favor legislating such a default rule, thereby
accelerating the trend to such a rule. An interesting analogy is the Code's
current withholding treatment of lump sum distributions. Today, federal
income taxes are generally withheld from a qualified plan distribution
271
unless the distributee elects a trustee-to-trustee rollover, i.e., a direct
payment of her distribution to an IRA or a qualified plan.272 Substantively,
this withholding rule does not affect the ultimate tax consequences of the
distributee's choices. If the employee undertakes a traditional rollover, tax
is withheld from the distribution. If the rollover is properly completed, the
previously withheld taxes are subsequently refunded on the employee's
federal income tax return for the rollover year. Under the no-withholding
rule, the employee making a trustee-to-trustee rollover instead pays no tax
on her rolled-over lump sum and thus receives no refund. Except for
liquidity273 and time-value-of-money concerns, there is no substantive
difference between paying tax and receiving a refund or avoiding
withholding ab initio. Either way, there is ultimately no tax due.
But, as behavioralists tell us, there may be a difference in how these
two possibilities are perceived by many individuals. Even one skeptical of
the vocabulary of framing effects might agree that a rule that suspends
withholding on trustee-to-trustee rollovers highlights the tax benefits of
rollovers and therefore might incline more distributees in that direction-as
opposed to the delayed reward of a refund at filing time. Similarly, there is
now enough experience and study to indicate that putting participants into
401(k) plans, unless they affirmatively elect current cash compensation
instead, overcomes some of the cognitive barriers (or, perhaps, uses those
barriers) to increase employees' participation in such plans.274
271. I.R.C. § 3405 (2000).
272. Id. § 401(a)(3 1).
273. If the employee making a traditional rollover desires to transfer the full amount of his
distribution to an IRA or a qualified plan, he must transfer from his own or borrowed resources an
amount equal to the taxes withheld.
274. Sunstein and Thaler come to a similar conclusion. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 17, at
1195.
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(3) Legitimate cash balance plans. The current status of cash balance
plans is anomalous. As a statutory matter, these plans violate the rules for
age discrimination because those rules require that all defined benefit
pensions (including cash balance arrangements) test for age discrimination
on the basis of projected annuities and because, converting cash balance
contributions to annuity equivalents, the same contribution declines in value
with the age of the participant. 75
On the other hand, as a matter of retirement policy, there is much to
commend cash balance plans. Under such plans, employers assume funding
and investment risk, as they are obligated to pay whatever is necessary to
finance the participants' notional account balances.276 As a practical matter,
if cash balance plans are outlawed, many (perhaps most) sponsors of such
plans will terminate their defined benefit arrangements and replace them
with defined contribution plans, under which funding and investment risk
shift to the employees.
To bring the statutory age discrimination rules into compliance with the
dictates of sound pension policy, I would amend the relevant statutes to
27authorize cross-testing for pension age discrimination.  This would permit
cash balance plans to test for age discrimination, not on the basis of annuity
equivalents but on the basis of theoretical contributions.278 On that basis,
most cash balance pensions will be deemed nondiscriminatory as to age.
279President Bush has now proposed legislation roughly along these lines.
There is no doubt that the conversion of traditional pensions to the cash
balance format upsets the sincerely held expectations of many older
workers. These older workers, on the verge of earning significant pension
275. See I.R.C. § 41 1(b)(1)(H)(i) (prohibiting the reduction of "the rate of an employee's
benefit accrual . . . because of the attainment of any age"); 29 U.S.C. § 623(i)(1)(A) (2000);
ERISA § 204(b)(1)(H)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(H)(i).
276. Cash balance plans generally allocate longevity risk to the participants because such
plans' standard distribution mode is a lump sum with which the participants can (but need not and
typically do not) purchase an individual annuity contract.
277. Zelinsky, supra note 4, at 759. Under current law, defined benefit plans cannot reduce
"the rate of an employee's benefit accrual" "because of the attainment of any age." I.R.C.
§ 41 1(b)(1)(H)(i); accord 29 U.S.C. § 623(i)(1)(A); ERISA § 204(b)(1)(H)(i), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1054(b)(1)(H)(i). If the notional contributions under cash balance plans are translated into the
annual annuity benefits those contributions purchase at retirement, the rate at which such benefits
are earned declines with age, because the same contribution for an older person has fewer years to
accumulate interest before an annuity must be provided at retirement. Hence the age
discrimination problem with cash balance plans.
278. Zelinsky, Rejoinder, supra note 175; Zelinsky, Is Cross-Testing a Mistake?, supra note
175.
279. See STAFF OF SENATE BUDGET COMM., 108TH CONG., PRESIDENT BUSH'S 2005
BUDGET 23 (2004), available at http://www.senate.gov/-budget/republican/analysis/2004/Instant/
2005Instant.pdf ("[The President's proposal aims to] clarify that a cash balance plan satisfies age-
discrimination rules if the plan provides pay credits for older workers that are not less than the pay
credits for younger workers.").
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accruals under traditional, back-loaded annuity-based formulas, instead find
themselves earning less (perhaps much less) under cash balance
arrangements. If I were the director of a company considering the
conversion of a traditional defined benefit plan to the cash balance format, I
would attempt to respond to those expectations either by giving employees
the option of remaining in the traditional plan280 or by giving older
employees extra credits under the cash balance formula to compensate for
the accruals they anticipated under the traditional format but will not
receive.
However, I would not mandate these approaches legislatively. 281 If
Congress requires either of these courses, some (perhaps many) employers
will simply terminate their traditional defined benefit plans rather than
convert those plans to the cash balance format, and will replace those
defined benefit pensions with individual account arrangements. That would
entail a net loss of retirement security (funding and investment risk will
shift from employer to employee) while accomplishing nothing for older
employees.
(4) Reduce scheduled Social Security benefit levels. Under the defined
contribution paradigm, there is a de facto division of responsibility between
private retirement plans and the Social Security system. In effect, we have
delegated to the federal government the task of providing, via Social
Security, traditional defined benefit coverage, particularly to low-income
individuals. In contrast, the private retirement regime predominantly places
risk and reward upon the individual account holder. Proposals to introduce
individual accounts to Social Security would alter this division of
responsibility by installing individual accounts in that system, thereby
diluting its defined benefit quality.
I am skeptical of such proposals. In the main, the half of the workforce
covered by private retirement plans already has opportunities for employer-
sponsored individual accounts. For them, accounts under the Social
Security system would be duplicative, if not redundant. Moreover, I am
doubtful about the wisdom of diminishing the defined benefit nature of
Social Security for the other half of the population that lacks private plan
coverage. In my judgment, the risks thereby imposed outweigh the potential
rewards.282
280. The best-known example of a company giving its employees this option is CSX, which
was under the leadership of John Snow before he became Secretary of the Treasury. See Walsh,
supra note 171.
281. The legislation proposed by President Bush would. See supra note 279 and
accompanying text.
282. I prefer to encourage the participation of lower-income individuals in the defmed
contribution paradigm by expanding the scope of the § 25B credit and by making that credit
permanent. See infra note 289 and accompanying text.
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However, the current benefit levels scheduled to be paid by Social
Security are not actuarially sustainable at prevailing FICA tax rates.
Because I see no prospect of increasing those tax rates (and, in any event,
am unenthusiastic about increasing those rates given their regressive
impact),283 the only way to restore actuarial balance to the Social Security
system is to reduce its projected benefit payments. Indeed, it should be (and
often is) the advocates of the defined benefit nature of Social Security who,
to preserve it, would bring the current Social Security system into actuarial
balance by reducing its benefit commitments.284
Here, again, the behavioralist perspective has useful lessons:
Economically equivalent benefit reductions may be perceived differently
when achieved through different formulas. For example, delaying Social
Security benefits (while keeping nominal annual payments the same) is
economically equivalent to starting a lower level of benefits earlier. As
Peter Diamond observes, "[C]hanging the age for full benefits is a benefit
cut, plain and simple .... "285 Nevertheless, pushing back the age at which
individuals may collect Social Security benefits seems more politically
palatable than an economically equivalent reduction of annual payments
commencing earlier. After all, who can deny the reality that ages like sixty-
tWO,286 sixty-five,2 87 and sixty-seven 288 carry different connotations for the
Woodstock generation than they did for that generation's parents?
(5) Make permanent and expand the § 25B credit. The advocates of
incorporating individual accounts within Social Security raise an important
283. It is true that, considering Social Security benefits and taxes together, the overall
package is somewhat progressive in incidence. That, however, does not allay my qualms about
increasing FICA taxes, an increase which imposes its heaviest burden on low-income persons and
deters their work efforts.
284. See, e.g., Aaron, supra note 36, at 89-94. Peter Diamond and Peter Orszag argue that
scheduled Social Security benefit increases can be scaled back in a fashion that simultaneously
helps to restore the actuarial balance of the Social Security system, maintains current benefits for
existing retirees and near retirees, and authorizes benefit increases for future retirees (just not as
great as the benefit increases scheduled for them under current law). DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra
note 31, at 28, 83, 87-88, 93, 167-70, 183. In their particulars, my conclusions are somewhat
different from those underpinning the Diamond-Orszag proposal. Specifically (and contrary to
that proposal), I believe that at least some near retirees should be forsaking some Social Security
benefits we are scheduled to receive and that the politically palatable way to do this is to push
back normal retirement age for us while that age is still a decade or more away. However, in its
broad outlines, the Diamond-Orszag proposal demonstrates that reducing scheduled Social
Security payments is critical to the maintenance and continuation of Social Security as a solvent
defined benefit plan.
285. PETER A. DIAMOND, TAXATION, INCOMPLETE MARKETS, AND SOCIAL SECURITY 127
(2003).
286. The early retirement age for Social Security old-age benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 416(/)(2)
(2000).
287. The Social Security normal retirement age for most individuals who were sixty-two
years old before January 1, 2000. Id. § 416()(1)(A).
288. The age to which Social Security normal retirement is scheduled to be changed over
time. Id. § 416()(1)(E).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
532 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 114:451
issue: the nonparticipation in the defined contribution paradigm by the half
of the population (largely lower-income individuals) who lack qualified
plan coverage. The federal government's principal device for encouraging
low-income individuals' IRA and 401(k) contributions, the tax credit of
§ 25B, suffers from two deficiencies.
First, the credit is set to expire at the end of 2006.289 Second, the credit
applies only to retirement contributions. If, however, saving for medical or
educational outlays is a higher priority for a particular low-income
taxpayer, the Code should respect that choice. Accordingly, I recommend
that the § 25B credit be made permanent and that its coverage be expanded,
not just to subsidize IRA and 401(k) contributions but to reward
contributions to MSAs, HSAs, educational IRAs, and § 529 programs if the
eligible taxpayer prefers any of these instead.
(6) Apply the ten percent limit on employer stock to defined
contribution plans. Diversification of retirement savings is good. ERISA
reflects the value of such diversification both by imposing upon plan
fiduciaries a general obligation to diversify the plan assets under their
control290 and by preventing defined benefit pension trusts from investing
more than ten percent of their total assets in employer stock.29'
In terms of diversification, it is particularly troubling for an employer
or for the employee herself to invest a significant portion of the employee's
retirement assets in her employer's stock because the employee's job, and
thus her current compensation, is already tied to her employer's economic
fate. Concentrating her retirement investments in the employer (whether
that concentration is imposed upon her or represents her voluntary choice)
creates an economic form of double jeopardy, further entwining her
finances with the employer's future performance. Some employees can win
from this kind of undiversified approach, just as some people can win the
lottery. But, as a matter of retirement policy, diversification is the more
sensible course. 92
It is thus today anomalous that the ten percent limit on employer stock
does not apply to defined contribution plans. This exemption from the ten
percent ceiling can best be understood historically. When ERISA was
adopted, defined benefit plans predominated. The typical money purchase
pension or profit-sharing plan supplemented a defined benefit arrangement.
289. I.R.C. § 25B(h) (West 2004).
290. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2000).
291. ERISA §§ 407,408(e), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1107, 1108(e); see also I.R.C. § 4975(d)(13).
292. See Gretchen Morgenson, Lopsided 401(k)'s, All Too Common, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,
2003, § 3 (Money & Business), at 1 ("After Enron collapsed, Congress discussed limits on the
amount of company stock that can be in a 401(k), but the issue died. Now, almost two years later,
investors in many 40 1(k) plans remain dangerously overexposed to their companies' stock.").
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Even if the defined contribution plan was loaded with employer stock, that
concentration was expected to be balanced by the diversified assets held in
the employer's defined benefit plan. Today, in contrast, with defined
contribution plans the main (often sole) retirement savings vehicles for
many employees, there frequently is no diversified pool of defined benefit
assets to offset heavy concentrations of employer stock in 401(k) or other
individual account arrangements.
With an appropriate transition period so that plans can sell their excess
employer stock holdings in an orderly fashion, the ten percent limit on
employer stock should apply to all defined contribution plans.293 Employers
would still be free to grant employees stock as current compensation and to
award stock options. However, the undiversified individual account plan,
bloated with employer stock, should, in the post-Enron era, become a thing
of the past. Given employers' evident determination, even after Enron, to
permit unlimited concentrations of employer stock in 401(k) accounts,294
ERISA's ten percent cap should be extended to defined contribution
arrangements also.
CONCLUSION
Pension experts have frequently remarked on the stagnation of the
defined benefit system and the corresponding rise of defined contribution
plans. I suggest that, over the last generation, something even more
fundamental has occurred, something that can justly be called a paradigm
shift. Americans today experience and conceive of retirement savings in the
form of individual accounts. Such accounts are primary instruments of
public policy, not just for retirement savings, but increasingly for health
care and education as well. Many of the surviving defined benefit pensions
will, through the cash balance format, mimic defined contribution
arrangements. For middle-class Americans, the defined contribution
paradigm effectively transforms the Internal Revenue Code into a
consumption tax.
The decline of the traditional defined benefit plan and the parallel
emergence of contemporary individual account arrangements has worked
well for many. However, the movement from the defined benefit
framework to the defined contribution paradigm will, in the long run, prove
problematic for some, perhaps many, employees by shifting from their
employers to them the investment, funding, and longevity risks associated
293. This would entail the phaseout of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs).
294. See, e.g., Fred Williams, More Employers Allow Unlimited Company Stock, PENSIONS
& INVESTMENTS, Oct. 27, 2003, at 1 ("87% of plan sponsors allow unlimited allocation of
participant assets in company stock, compared to 59% in last year's survey.").
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with retirement savings. Nevertheless, there is today no realistic chance of
resuscitating the classic annuity-paying defined benefit plan. We are simply
too far down the defined contribution road. Our task now is to make the
defined contribution paradigm work.
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